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Bruce Hellinga, Ph.D., P.Eng.
University of Waterloo

Abstract
The Region of Waterloo, Ontario, is a rapidly-growing metropolitan area approximately 100 km west of Toronto. In 2005, the Region’s transit operator, Grand River
Transit, introduced an express bus service, known as iXpress, along the central northsouth corridor of the Region. This paper explores the impact of the iXpress service on
transit user costs and passenger attraction. We employ a methodology to quantify
the generalized cost (including waiting time, in-vehicle and transfer times) of transit
trips between key destinations in the Region before and after the implementation of
iXpress. We also develop a methodology to identify those customers who benefit from
the reduced cost of the iXpress. Finally, we present the change in ridership (boardings)
in the corridor pre- and post-implementation. From these demand and cost data, we
compute transit elasticity of demand with respect to generalized cost.

Introduction
The Region of Waterloo,1 located approximately 100 km west of Toronto in southern Ontario, comprises three cities—Kitchener, Waterloo and Cambridge—and
four rural townships. The Region has a population of approximately 500,000 but
is expected to reach 730,000 by 2031 (Region of Waterloo 2003.) Commensurate
job growth is also predicted. In response to these growth pressures, the Region of
Waterloo (2003) developed a Regional Growth Management Strategy (RGMS) to
1
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manage the locations of new homes and jobs and to provide suitable transportation alternatives. A principle component of the RGMS is a balanced transportation
system that promotes multimodal travel options and leads to intensified land
uses. One major investment in the Region’s Grand River Transit (GRT) has been
the introduction of an express bus service, known as iXpress, connecting major
activity centers along the region’s central north-south corridor.

Figure 1. Location and Composition of the Regional Municipality of
Waterloo in Southern Ontario
This paper develops and applies a methodology to analyze the impacts of the
iXpress on travel costs and ridership in an existing transit corridor. We compute
the differences in generalized costs (including waiting time, in-vehicle time, and
transfer time) for travel between major activity centers in the Region before and
after the introduction of iXpress. We define and apply a methodology to identify
transit customers who benefit from the introduction of the iXpress service. We
2
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also present the number of boardings in a service corridor that took place pre- and
post-implementation of the iXpress service. Based on the reduction in generalized
cost and increase in ridership, we compute the elasticity of transit demand with
respect to generalized cost.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The following section presents
a literature review of generalized cost formulations and elasticity models for analyzing transit demand. In the third section, further detail is provided on the Region
of Waterloo and the iXpress service. Section four presents the methodology used
in computing generalized costs and applies that method to the case study. Elasticities are presented. In section five, the results of elasticity computations are analyzed and the shortcomings of elasticity models are presented. Section six presents
conclusions and suggestions for further research.

Literature Review
The concept of utility theory suggests that consumers choose an alternative
that possesses a set of characteristics that maximizes the benefit derived by the
consumer (Lancaster 1966). Transportation studies often assume that travelers
derive no utility from the trip itself, but rather travel to achieve other goals (i.e.,
work, shopping, education etc.) Thus, travel consumers are modeled not as utility
maximizers, but instead as disutility (or generalized cost) minimizers. Disutility
of transit travel has the following components (Kittelson and Associates 2003):
access time to transit service, waiting time, in-vehicle time, transfer times (where
applicable), egress times, and fares. Typically, the relative contribution to overall
disutility of these individual attributes is expressed by a weighted, linear sum of
the attributes (Ortuzar and Williamson 2001). For example, most studies suggest
that passengers perceive waiting time and transfer time to be more onerous than
in-vehicle travel times.
Utility theory has long been used in mode choice models to predict transit ridership. When choosing between competing modes (typically transit and auto), a
traveler’s propensity to choose a given mode is a function of the relative generalized costs, or disutility, of the competing modes. Often, logit or probit models are
used to compute the probability of choosing a mode amongst a set of candidate
modes based on a comparison of their generalized costs (Ben Akiva and Leman
1985). These models often are employed at the regional level as part of travel
forecasting work.
3

Journal of Public Transportation, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2008

Utility models have been employed to assess the impacts of potential changes in
transit services on transit ridership in regional corridors. Examples of this type of
study include Kopp et al. (2006) in Chicago and Casello (2007) in Philadelphia. The
benefits of corridor-level analysis are that it allows for a more detailed representation of transit costs than is possible when working at a regional level and requires
significantly less data and computational effort. As such, corridor-level analysis
may be feasible for transit agencies to complete in-house, thereby reducing reliance on consultants or external travel models.
The output of corridor level analysis may also be elasticities of demand with
respect to generalized cost that may be assumed to be valid within the study area.
The use of elasticities to predict changes in travel habits has been studied extensively. A comprehensive reference list of such studies is presented by Taylor and
Miller (2003). In the same paper, the authors present a two stage, least-squares
regression that considers the ridership impacts of non-transportation variables
(geography, economy, and population) as well as transport variables (auto ownership, fuel prices, transit supply and cost). Their results are consistent with most
other studies—that transit supply (positively correlated) and fares (negatively
correlated) are both statistically significant predictors of transit ridership, which
explain much (in their case, 95%) of the variation in ridership.
In the current application, the generalized cost, or disutility, of travel is computed
without and with the iXpress service. The change in disutility is correlated to
changes in ridership through standard elasticity models. Litman (2004) defines
short- and long-term elasticities and presents the findings for various inputs (fares,
auto costs, income, etc.), modes, and locations. A more sophisticated summary
of previous studies is presented by Holmgren (2007), who utilizes a meta-analysis
method to draw conclusions about the importance of functional form, data inclusion, data types, and environmental factors on predicted elasticities. Holmgren
also presents observed ranges of several demand elasticities (price, supply, income,
auto ownership, and fuel prices). Balcombe et al. (2004) present elasticities for
various components of generalized costs using UK examples.
Ideally, the travel patterns of individual transit customers could be surveyed
and recorded, and changes in behavior in response to changes in transit services
could be evaluated on an individual origin-destination basis. This would require
extensive data collection that would only be feasible if fully automated, perhaps
through smart card fare collection technology. In the absence of smart cards, we
suggest that corridor level analysis provides an appropriate balance between data
4
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requirements and the robustness of the ridership projections. The potential levels
of transit analysis are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Possible Levels of Analysis for Predicting Changes in Ridership
as a Result of Transit Service Change

The current paper builds upon the existing literature in several ways. First, the
paper develops and implements a method to analyze comprehensively the change
in travel parameters as a result of the proposed transit service upgrades. Second,
the paper applies utility theory to compute the changes in generalized costs for
trips made between major activity centers. The changes in generalized cost are
then compared to observed changes in ridership to compute mid-run elasticities
for a specific case. The calculated elasticities are compared to previously published
results.

The Region of Waterloo and iXpress service
Waterloo Region is one of the most diverse and dynamic economic regions in
Canada. The area extending from Toronto in the east, Niagara Falls in the south,
and the Region of Waterloo in the west is known as the Greater Golden Horseshoe
5
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(GGH). The GGH is often referred to as the economic engine of Ontario. The entire
GGH is experiencing strong development pressures. The Province of Ontario has
produced a strategic plan known as “Places to Grow,” which intends to steer development to targeted built-up areas. The Region of Waterloo is one of these areas.
The Region itself is a significant contributor to the national economy, with an
annual estimated regional GDP of over $16 billion (CDN) derived from a strong
mix of agricultural, manufacturing, and service sector employment. A major challenge for the Region in light of the projected growth is to accommodate increased
housing and employment lands without diminishing the value of local agricultural
activities. Moreover, the Region currently experiences very little congestion. The
intention of Regional planners is to develop a balanced, multi-modal transportation system that will both facilitate future travel demands and positively influence
land uses (achieve intensification). The iXpress service is a major step towards balanced transportation alternatives in the Region.
iXpress Service
The iXpress is a limited-stop, express service that travels between Waterloo, Kitchener, and Cambridge. The alignment, shown in Figure 2, is approximately 33 km in
length and consists of 13 stops. Along the route are four downtowns (two in Cambridge), two universities, office complexes, major hospitals, and regional shopping
centers. When the iXpress service commenced in September 2005, it operated
between 06:45 and 19:00 Monday through Friday, with 15-minute headways during the morning and afternoon peak periods and 30-minute headways during the
midday. In the fall of 2007, weekday service was extended to 05:40 and 23:00; Saturday and Sunday services were introduced. The iXpress service is provided using
standard 40-foot Nova low-floor buses that are differentiated from buses servicing
local routes by unique exterior branding.
Prior to 1999, transit service was operated by two independent providers—one
serving Kitchener and Waterloo, the other serving Cambridge. In 2000, the system
was unified under a single operator, the Region of Waterloo, which created Grand
River Transit. Despite unifying operations, the previous route structure remained.
Prior to the introduction of iXpress, no single-seat connections were provided
between Cambridge and points north of Fairview Mall; all trips between Cambridge and central Kitchener and Waterloo required a transfer.
In addition to providing regional connectivity, the introduction of iXpress supplemented a local transit route (Route 7) within Kitchener and Waterloo, between
6
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Figure 2. iXpress and Local Routes Connecting Activity Centers in
Cambridge, Kitchener and Waterloo
the Fairview and Conestoga Mall iXpress stops. Route 7 is operated with three
northern branches—two terminating at the University of Waterloo and one
terminating at Conestoga Mall. During peak periods, Route 7 headways on the
common section are approximately 5 minutes and 15 minutes for each branch.
Note that no direct (single-seat) service is provided by Route 7 from the University of Waterloo to Conestoga Mall. iXpress also supplements two local routes
in Cambridge. Route 51 connects three activity centers—the Ainslie, Cambridge
Center and Hespler terminals along Hespler Road, a major commercial artery in
the Region. Route 52 connects the Ainslie terminal and Fairview Mall via King St.
in Cambridge and Highway 8 in Kitchener.
The next sections demonstrate a methodology to quantify the benefits and beneficiaries as a result of the implementation of iXpress.

Methodology
The goals of this paper are to demonstrate a method to analyze the impacts of
express bus service on transit users’ costs, to identify those users who benefit from
7
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these reduced costs, and finally to correlate changes in cost to ridership gains. To
estimate the reductions in user costs, we quantify the changes in travel costs for
three travel patterns:
1. The corridor between Ainslie St. Terminal and Smartcentres, where the
iXpress supplements Route 51. This represents travel between activity
centers within the city of Cambridge.
2. Trips between Ainslie Terminal, Fairview Mall, and all points along the Route
7 alignments. This represents travel between one Cambridge activity center
and many activity centers in Kitchener and Waterloo.
3. The corridor between Fairview Mall and Conestoga Mall, including the University of Waterloo, but not Tech Park or McCormick because local service
was not previously provided to those stops. This quantifies the improvement
as a result of iXpress in the existing Route 7 corridor.
In our case, the introduction of express service affects passengers in the following
ways:
• For the travel patterns considered, iXpress operates on the same alignment
as local service so that the access and egress times for express service are
the same as the local service. We therefore eliminate access and egress time
from our generalized cost computations.
• iXpress may increase or decrease passenger waiting times, depending on the
frequency of the existing local service in the corridor and the specific origin
and destination of the traveler (see section on waiting times, below).
• iXpress reduces in-vehicle times because there are fewer stops than on local
service.
• iXpress connects origin-destination pairs directly, eliminating the need for
passenger transfers.
Waiting times, in-vehicle times and transfer times are analyzed in detail in the following sections.
Waiting Times
In calculating passenger waiting times, we make the following assumptions. First,
we assume that wait time is correlated to service frequency as follows. For short
headways, less than or equal to 10 minutes, we assume random passenger arrivals
and an average wait time of ½ the headway. For headways greater than 10 minutes,
we assume passengers consult schedules, but still allow slightly longer wait times.
8
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Mathematically, we apply the following continuous functions to compute wait
times:

Eq. 1

where:		

WT

is the waiting time in minutes

		

h

is the headway in minutes.

For headways greater than 10 minutes, Equation 1 predicts a wait time that
increases as headways increase, but moves asymptotically to a maximum wait
time of 10 minutes. This model is very similar to that found empirically by Lam and
Morall (1982), as shown in Figure 3. Sensitivity to this waiting time formulation is
explored in subsequent sections.

Figure 3. Comparison of Predicting Waiting Times
by Lam and Morrall and Eq. 1
In considering traveler behavior, we are faced with three alternatives. We may
assume that customers prefer single-seat rides (trips without transfers) and, therefore, extend their wait time for iXpress to avoid a transfer. Alternatively, we may
9
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assume that customers minimize their wait times by boarding the first arriving
vehicle regardless if a transfer is necessary. The third alternative, which we apply in
our method, is the assumption that transit customers choose the lowest generalized cost alternative of the previous two choices. This is consistent with oft-cited
user equilibrium condition.
Travel Time Analysis
Because of its limited stops, iXpress has significantly shorter travel time compared
to local routes that serve the same alignment. We compute the difference in interstation travel times for trips completed by local routes (7, 51, and 52) and trips
completed by iXpress in each of the travel corridors. Note that this analysis considers only the difference in in-vehicle time; transfer times are considered separately
in the next section.
Transfer Times
The method developed by Vuchic (2005) to estimate average transfer times
between two lines with headways h1 and h2 , as presented in Equation 2, is used.

Eq. 2
Where:
E(TT)		

expected (average) transfer time, min

h1		

time headway of originating line, min

h2 		

time headway of destination line, min

Using Equation 2, we compute the transfer times necessary for local trips that
include routes 51 and 7 (transfers at Fairview Mall) and between branches of
Route 7 (transfers at Laurier). No transfers are required for trips on the iXpress.
Computing Generalized Cost
Having computed the changes in each cost component (waiting, in-vehicle and
transfer times), generalized costs for travel between all O-D pairs is calculated. The
generalized cost, GC, is calculated as shown in Equation 3.
Eq. 3

10
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Where:
GC

generalized cost for travel from origin O to destination D via route i, $

i

relative weight of cost component i

WT waiting time, min
INVT in-vehicle travel time, min
TT

transfer time, min

VOT value of time, $/hr
fare Transit fare, $
Passengers perceive the passage of time differently for each portion of their trip
(i.e., wait time at the stop, in-vehicle time, and transfer time). Because we have no
local information on the relative weights of the cost components, we utilize the
mean values presented in Kittelson et al. (2003, p. 3-20), as shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Relative Weights of Cost Components
Used in Generalized Cost Calculations

Many wide-ranging estimates exist for value of travel time in the literature. We
use a simple estimate of value of time, $8 per hour. Because our analysis involves
percent reductions in travel costs, our findings are largely insensitive to the value
of time assumption. The GRT pre-paid fare is $1.40.
We are primarily concerned with the reduction in generalized costs for passengers
after the implementation of the iXpress service. As such, we define the reduction
in generalized cost, GC as:
Eq. 4
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Where:

GCL is the generalized cost from O to D via local service, $

		

GCX is the generalized cost from O to D via iXpress service, $

As noted above, this method assumes that passengers choose the lowest-cost
alternative. In the cases where local service is less expensive than iXpress, then we
see a zero reduction in generalized cost.
Finally, we compute the percent change in generalized cost as shown in Equation
5:
Eq. 5
Corridor 1 Analysis
In Corridor 1, existing Route 51 service with a frequency of two buses per hour is
supplemented by four iXpress runs per hour. The iXpress also has shorter travel
times, saving five minutes between Ainslie Terminal and Cambridge Centre and
an additional six minutes between Cambridge Centre and Smartcentres. Neither
route requires a transfer. The steps in computing the change in generalized cost
are summarized in Table 3.
Because of the reduced in-vehicle and waiting times, the introduction of iXpress
reduces generalized costs between these origin-destination pairs by between 22
and 27 percent.
Corridor 2 Analysis
In Corridor 2, iXpress connects origin-destination pairs that were previously
served by Route 7 with high frequency service. As a result, many of the main line
station pairs remain best served by local service. Naturally, as the distance traveled
increases, the benefits of higher speeds on iXpress offset longer waiting times, and
benefits are derived for iXpress trips. For the University of Waterloo, iXpress introduces higher-frequency, direct connections in both the north and southbound
directions. Significant reductions in generalized costs are experienced for trips
beginning from or destined for the University.
Using the same methodology presented in the Corridor 1 analysis, we compute
the reductions in generalized costs as a result of iXpress between origin-destination pairs in Corridor 2. These are shown in Table 4.

12
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Table 3. Full Methodology for Computing Reduction in Generalized Cost
as a Result of iXpress Service

Table 4. Percent Reductions in Generalized Costs for O-D Pairs in Corridor 2

The range of travel cost savings for this corridor is 0 percent (where the local service remains the lowest cost option) to 33 percent for travel between Conestoga
and the University of Waterloo.
13
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Corridor 3 Analysis
In the Corridor 3 analysis, we attempt to identify the cost savings between Ainslie
Terminal and northern activity centers. This analysis is a measure of the regional
connectivity improvements as a result of iXpress. Table 5 shows the cost reductions. For simplicity, only the reductions in cost from Ainslie Terminal to all northern stops are shown; the cost savings are symmetric.
Table 5. Percent Reduction in Generalized Costs for Trips Originating from
the Ainslie St. Terminal (Corridor 3)

The range of cost savings in this case is between 16 and 28 percent.
Identifying Transit Customers Who Benefit from iXpress
To identify those customers who benefit from the introduction of iXpress, we
consider those transit riders who travel in Corridor 2. As shown in Figure 3, there
are four trip types that involve some travel through the corridor:
1. Type I: a trip that both begins and ends in the corridor (O1, D1)
2. Type II: a trip that begins outside the corridor on a local route, L1, but ends
in the corridor (O2, D1) via a transfer
3. Type III: a trip that begins in the corridor but ends outside the corridor (O1,
D2) via a transfer to a local route, L2
4. Type IV: a trip that begins outside the corridor on a local route, L1, transfers
for travel through the corridor, then transfers to a local route, L2, to reach
the destination (O2, D2)
Prior to the introduction of iXpress, all trips through the corridor involved only
Route 7. After the introduction of iXpress, each of these trips may involve a transfer to either iXpress or to Route 7, whichever involves the lowest generalized cost.
The benefits derived as a result of iXpress differs for each of these trip types. Table
6 quantifies these benefits.
In each case, the potential generalized cost saving is the same—the reduction
associated with the iXpress compared to the Route 7 service. The percent reduction, however, varies for each trip type. For those trips that involve transfer to
and/or from local service, the time savings along the central corridor represents a
smaller percentage of total trip time. This is indicated by the increasing denominator in the third column of Table 6.
14
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Figure 4. Identifying the Trip Patterns Influenced by the Introduction of iXpress
Table 6. Reductions in Generalized Cost (Total and %) for Each Trip Type

Correlating Changes in Generalized Cost to Ridership Gains
A common economic tool to predict changes in demand as a result of changes in
price is to compute elasticity of demand with respect to price. Mathematically,
elasticity, E, is defined as:
15
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Eq. 6
Where:

D is the change in demand, %

		

P is the change in price, %

In our case, we have computed the change in generalized cost for trips between
individual origin-destination pairs. As noted in the literature review, ideally these
changes in O-D costs could be compared to changes in ridership between O-D
pairs. However, due to data limitations, only the change in corridor demand is
known. Therefore, to compute elasticities, we utilize these changes in O-D costs
to compute a corridor-wide change in generalized cost.
From ridership surveys (Region of Waterloo 2005), the percentage of total trips
between each O-D pair is known. Therefore, to compute a corridor-wide elasticity,
we calculate a weighted average of reduced generalized costs within the corridor
based on travel patterns. Mathematically, this average is given by:
Eq. 7
Where:

GC is the weighted average of generalized cost savings, $

		
TOD
			

is the observed percentage of transit trips from origin
to destination

The percentages of trips between origin destination pairs are given in Table 7.
From Equation 7, we compute a weighted average generalized cost reduction of
14.1 percent.
This calculation provides the average benefits accrued for travel within the corridor. As noted in the previous section, not all travelers realize this full benefit.
Those who make trip type I accrue the full benefit. For trip types II, III and IV, a
lesser benefit is realized as a percentage of total trip cost.

16
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Table 7. Percentage of Travel Between All O-D Pairs

To estimate the benefits realized by travelers making trip types II - IV, we make
the following assumption. We assume that the travel cost on each local section is
equal to the travel cost in the corridor. Mathematically, we assume:
GCL1 = GCL2 = GC7

Eq. 8

This results in trip types II and III experiencing one half the generalized cost reduction and trip type IV experiencing one third the cost reduction.
Again, from travel surveys, we know the percentage of trip makers through the
corridor that makes trips of each type. We can then weigh the number of trip
takers by their expected reduction in generalized cost to compute a final, corridorwide reduction in generalized costs. These calculations are shown in Table 8.
Table 8. Computing Corridor-Wide Reduction in Generalized Cost

Thus, the introduction of the iXpress service in the corridor reduced cost by an
average of 9.5 percent.
Finally, to compute elasticity, we calculate the percent change in demand through
the corridor. Prior to the introduction of iXpress, there were 15,941 boardings in
the Route 7 corridor. When boardings were counted in the corridor after iXpress,

17
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there were 16,528 boardings on Route 7 and 2,701 boardings on iXpress, for a total
of 19,229.
In the time between the two counts, GRT system ridership grew by 7 percent system wide. To account for this growth, we compute the difference in actual boardings (19,229) to expected boardings (15,941*1.07=17,057) assuming ridership on
Route 7 grew at the system average. This calculation results in a net growth of
2,172 boardings, or 12.7 percent.
The elasticity of demand with respect to generalized cost can be computed using
equation 6, with D = 12.7% and P = 9.5%. The elasticity, E, is then equal to
-1.3.
Understanding Model Results
Other researchers (as summarized by Litman and Balcombe et al.) typically
observed absolute values of short-term elasticities for quality of service, quantity
of supply, and price in the range of 0.5 to 0.7, and long-term in the range of 0.7
to 1.1. The elasticity observed in this research (which can be considered short- to
mid-term) is -1.3, which is inconsistent with the previous findings. We suggest
that this surprisingly large value is a result of computing the elasticity of ridership
with respect to the composite generalized cost. As noted above, in our case, the
introduction of the iXpress results in decreased waiting time, shortened in-vehicle
time, and fewer transfers. The results of previous research (Balcombe et al. 2004)
suggests a mean elasticity value for ridership with respect to passenger waiting
time of -0.64; the same research reports a mean value of elasticity of ridership with
respect to in-vehicle time of -0.5. No study was found to directly compute the
elasticity for ridership with respect to transfer times.
Consider the following example. If waiting time were reduced by 10 percent,
using an elasticity value of -0.64, ridership is expected to increase by 6.4 percent.
Subsequently, if in-vehicle travel time were reduced by 10 percent, ridership is
expected to increase by an additional 5.0 percent. The total increase is calculated
as 1.064*1.05 or 1.117 or 11.7 percent. Using our generalized cost representation
and assuming no transfer, if both in-vehicle time and waiting time were reduced
by 10 percent (as in the previous case), then the generalized cost would be reduced
by 10 percent. From our elasticity finding of -1.3, we would expect an increase in
ridership of 13 percent, which is consistent with previous findings.

18
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Sensitivity Analysis
In assigning the relative weights of travel disutility (equation 3), we assumed the
average value presented by Kittelson et al. Further, we assumed a standard value
of time of $8.00 per hour. To assess the sensitivity of our findings to these assumed
values, we present the following analysis. We recomputed the percent reduction
in generalized cost in the corridor while varying each of the assumptions from a
minimum of 0.5 times the initial value to a maximum of 1.5 times the initial value.
For example, in the initial analysis, we assume waiting time is considered 2.1 times
as onerous as in-vehicle time. To test the sensitivity, we compute the reductions in
generalized costs if waiting time ranged from 1.05 times to 3.15 times as onerous
as in-vehicle time. Similarly, we test values for transfer time that range from 1.25 to
3.75. Finally, we compute percent reductions in generalized travel costs for ranges
of value of time from $4.00 to $12.00. The results are shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5. Sensitivity of Generalized Cost Reductions to
Parameter Assumptions
When all the initial parameters are multiplied by 1.00, the reductions in generalized cost equal the result presented in the previous section, approximately 9.5
percent. In analyzing each parameter, it is noted that the reductions in generalized
costs are most sensitive to the relative weight for waiting time. If we reduce the
relative importance of waiting time in calculating generalized cost, then travelers
19
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in the corridor experience savings of 11.1 percent. If we increase the importance
of waiting time, then the benefits accrued from iXpress are reduced to approximately 8.3 percent in the corridor. This is logical as the introduction of iXpress has
the least impact on waiting times in this corridor.
Varying the importance of transfer times has little effect on the net benefits
associated with iXpress, with the generalized costs savings varying from 9.2- 9.8
percent. Obviously, as transfer times become relatively more important, generalized costs savings increase. Similarly, the magnitude of corridor savings increases
with increased of value of time, but only marginally. If we assume travelers have
very low value of time, then the travel cost savings falls from the initial value of 9.5
percent to approximately 8.7 percent. Under the assumption of high value of time,
$12.00 per hour, then the travel cost savings increase to 9.8 percent.

iXpress Service Performance and Upgrade Plans
During the planning of iXpress, Grand River Transit forecasted ridership projections for several periods: immediately after service initiation, at the time when all
supporting technologies for iXpress had been implemented, and one year after
this full implementation. These BRT technologies include transit signal priority
(TSP) along its corridor, AVLS to support real time arrival information at all locations, a web-based trip planner, and an interactive voice response (IVR) system
to provide passenger information. At the time of the most recent data collection,
several delays had precluded the full implementation of these technologies. Table
9 summarizes how ridership (average weekday boardings) forecasts compare with
actual ridership.
Table 9. Projected and Actual Ridership Values

Based on the success of the iXpress, the Region has undertaken an Environmental
Assessment to determine the feasibility and optimal design of an upgraded, rapid
transit system which will be operated on longitudinally separated right of way. The
process is ongoing, with final approval slated for 2009.
20
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Conclusions
This paper presents a methodology to assess the impacts of express bus service in
areas with existing transit service. The method presented is based on utility theory,
the traditional model used in mode choice models. However, the application in
this case is done for individual origin-destination pairs in three corridors such
that micro-level generalized cost components (waiting time, in-vehicle time, and
transfer times) can be readily computed before and after the introduction of the
express service. We find cost savings for individual O-D pairs that range from 0%
(local service remaining the best option) to as high as 33 percent.
Next, using survey data that provide travel volumes between O-D pairs, we
aggregate the O-D cost savings to a corridor-wide average travel cost savings for
the highest ridership area. We calculate an average travel cost savings of approximately 9.5 percent for all riders as a result of the iXpress. The benefits of computing
this corridor-wide cost reduction is that corridor elasticity can now be computed
based only on the changes of boardings in the corridor, rather than a change in
O-D volumes. When combined with an increase in demand in the corridor of
12.3 percent, this cost reduction suggests an observed elasticity of demand with
respect to price of 1.3.
Finally, we test the sensitivity of our travel cost savings to the assumed weights of
waiting time and transfer time, as well as value of travel time. All of these variables
display the expected relationships: travel costs savings decrease as waiting time
becomes more important (because the express service contributes little to waiting time savings); travel costs savings increase with transfer times becoming more
important, and with increasing value of time. The magnitude of each of these
changes suggests that the model is largely insensitive to these parameter values.

Endnotes
Many Canadian metropolitan areas have so-called Regional governments that,
in essence, act as a bridge between Provincial and municipal governance. The
Regional Municipality of Waterloo has legal responsibility to develop a Regional
Official Plan which is consistent with the Province in its strategic planning goals,
and sets the objectives for municipal plans. The Region also operates Grand River
Transit, the region’s transit service.
1
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in Stochastic Networks
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Abstract
This work is a report on research concerning transit service characteristics as seen
from the users’ point of view. Users of two separate bus lines, operating in a shared/
common urban infrastructure, were interviewed at bus stops about their perception
concerning headways of bus lines operation. An analysis was made regarding deviations between actual and scheduled bus arrival headway. Further statistical analysis
was carried out to check factors giving rise to different perceptions. The operation
of each bus line was registered, and corresponding service characteristics were compared with those perceived by the users. Based on these results, a model for bus line
headways was proposed, incorporating the perception of deviations by the users. In
conclusion, a reliable service, meaning smaller deviations, is more appreciated by the
public than any service of shorter headways and less reliability.

Introduction
In recent studies regarding travel time and reliability, it has been found that
travelers are not only interested in saving travel time but also in reducing travel
time variability. Their attitudes and “choice of way and route” strongly depend
on this perception. Variability causes uncertainty, as they do not know arrival
time at the destination. Thus, variability is considered by travelers as an additional
25
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cost. Research is rather limited on demand-and-supply variation effects on travel
time reliability in an uncertain environment. For example, a recent report was
examined how individual travelers with different risk-taking attitudes responded
to such changes (Chen et al. 2001). Route choice models that were originally
proposed were based on the assumption that all travelers are aware of the travel
times of a certain network (deterministic models [Beckmann et al. 1956] as well as
stochastic models [Daganzo amd Sheffi 1977; Fisk 1980; Sheffi and Powell 1982]).
However, both categories of models tend to disregard network uncertainty (stochasticity) and assume that the network is deterministic, an assumption that is
not true, especially during rush hours.
This paper, based on a recent university study (Daskalakis 2002), focuses on how
passengers perceive reliability of bus line operation, and models the relationship
between bus line operation characteristics and this perceived measure of reliability.

Travel Time Perception and Evaluation by Passengers
Travel time is a natural measure of the effectiveness of a bus service. The purpose
of bus service is to transport people to their destination with safety and convenience, offering easy access and providing service information. However, most
people rate travel speed and, consequently, travel time above all quality characteristics (Chen et al. 2002). This time often varies considerably, primarily during rush
hours in everyday commuting.
Waiting time deviation is an indicator of how passengers experience the operation
of a bus line, while waiting at the same stop, around the same period of the day,
when headway schedules are the same. Studies concerning time cost have shown
that passengers would rather wait than pay for a more frequent service, though
not for long (Hess et al. 2003). Bus operators aim at offering services that best suit
passenger needs. Does this mean they have to provide more frequent bus schedules, which is something evidently expensive, or is there any other way of keeping
passengers sufficiently satisfied while waiting for the bus? The answer should be
regular bus transportation, leading to an increased quality of service.

Collection and Analysis of Data
To acquire data that would assist in this evaluation of user perception of bus
schedule variability, a survey was conducted downtown Athens, Greece. Frequen26
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cies of bus lines were registered on site and were compared to the original scheduled frequencies by OASA (Athens Urban Transportation Organization).
Two lines were selected: line A and line B (originally code named “A14” and “730”),
linking central Athens to western suburban districts. The survey was carried out
from May to June (on usual weekdays, primarily Tuesdays and Thursdays) from
07:00 to 17:00, covering both morning and afternoon commuting. More specifically, the time period 07:00- 09:30 was chosen to cover traveling to work from the
suburbs to central Athens. This period was called the inbound direction “I.” The
period 13:45-16:45 was chosen primarily for passengers returning to their homes,
following the outbound (“O”) direction. It is noted that, during the days and the
times of the interviews, weather conditions were normal, no major events affected
the usual operation of bus lines, and the interviewed passengers were chosen randomly. These two bus lines are operated by ETHEL (an OASA partner, responsible
for operating thermal buses). Both are radial-shaped, linking the commercial center of Athens with suburban districts and run along signalized arterials (see Tables
1 and 2). By the time of the research, schedule information was not posted at bus
stops. Passengers had to find out the scheduled bus line frequency usually by asking bus drivers. For survey needs, such data were derived from original scheduling
timetables of OASA.
Table 1. Characteristics of the Surveyed Bus Lines
Line A				
Line B
		
Inbound (I)		 Outbound (O)		
Inbound (I)		 Outbound (O)
Route length (m)
No. of stops
Average length
between stops (m)

7631		
27		

7270		
26		

7555		
25		

7097
26

293		

280		

302		

273

Scheduled round
85				
trip time (min)				
Source: Athens Urban Transportation Organization

80

Table 2. Scheduled and Observed (Mean) Bus Headways
Line		
Direction
Scheduled time (min)
Mean observed time (min)

A			

I		
7.9		
8.2		

O
6.9
7.7

B

I		 O
17.0		 16.0
21.0		 16.6
27
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Basic questions asked were the following:
1) How often do you use this particular bus line (weekdays)? (daily—4+ days
a week, 2-3 times a week, 1-2 times a month, less than once a month)
2) In your opinion, what is the usual delay? (no delay, considerable, much,
too much) (i.e., magnitude of the delay)
3) In your usual schedule, how long would you be willing to wait for the bus?
(0, 5, 15, 20, 20+ min)
4) From your experience, how long (in minutes) is the usual bus latency? (0,
5, 15, 20, 20+ min)
5) How long do you usually wait at the bus stop before concluding that the
bus is late? (0, 5, 15, 20, 20+ min)
6) How long (in minutes) would you be prepared to wait for the bus? (0, 5,
15, 20, 20+ min)
7) You arrive at the bus stop. When would you decide that your schedule has
been seriously affected? (0, 5, 15, 20, 20+ min)
8) What is the purpose of the particular trip? (work, returning home, education, shopping, recreation, other)
9) After how long (in minutes) would you consider the delay unjustified?
10) Suppose that the exact arrival time is indicated at the bus stop. How would
you describe a bus delay of
a) 5 minutes? (short, average, long, unacceptable)
b) 10 minutes? (short, average, long, unacceptable)
A total of 300 valid questionnaires were collected. The resulting data were subjected to a series of statistical tests and analysis.
T-tests were conducted for each travelling direction with regard to different
expressions of waiting time perception, as addressed in questions 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 and
10. Table 3 shows the statistical results for the means, standard deviations and the
significance levels for the null hypothesis H0 of equal means.
No assumption of equal means, except that for question 5, was found to be statistically significant with a confidence coefficient in excess of (1-)5 = 95%, since
all t-statistics were over 0.05. Homogeneity of variance test was performed by
calculating Levene’s statistic to verify the assumption of homogeneity of variance
28
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Table 3. Statistical Results (t-test)

that would certify the performance of further tests, such as ANOVA and Discriminate Analysis. Levene’s test is an alternative to Bartlett test (Bartlett 1937),
testing also observations originating from populations showing the same variance
that depend heavily on the assumption that these observations refer to normal
distributions. Since in our case is that no such evidence exists, Levene’s test was
considered as preferable.
Regarding questions 6 and 10, the test confirmed heteroscedasticity with confidence coefficient (1-)6,10 = 99.8%. That is, the hypothesis that waiting time (as
specified in questions 6 and 10) is of equal levels of variance for both directions “I”
and “O” is not accepted. Consequently, the answers to questions 6 and 10 do not
explain the same proportion of the variance by direction.
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Results of the t-tests for the rest of the questions 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9 did not indicate
significant differences concerning the means of the given answers for a confidence
coefficient (1-)3,4,6,7,9 >90%, and no definite conclusion may be drawn about the
effect on the answers of any of the two directions. In question 10, for a waiting
time of 5 minutes, the mean value of the answers given by the passengers of direction “O” is greater than that of direction “I” with a confidence coefficient of (1-)10
= 95%. It should be noted that the ordinal scale of question 10 was transformed
to a numerical, using the following convention: small = 1, medium = 2, large = 3,
unacceptable = 4.
Similar tests were performed for each line separately, combining the two directions. Relevant results are shown in Table 4. All the differences of the means for
the two bus lines, except that of question 7, are statistically significant with a
confidence coefficient (1- )3,4,5,6,9,10(5) >95%. In questions 5, 6 and 10, Levene’s test
gives  <0.05, which reveals heteroscedasticity. That is, the null hypothesis that
the variable (waiting time as specified in questions 5, 6 and 10) has equal levels for
both bus lines A and B does not hold and the variance cannot be explained at the
same degree.
There is also a direct correspondence between the answers given by passengers to
questions 3, 4 and 9 and the type of bus line. In particular, passengers of bus line A
stated at the above questions significantly (with a confidence coefficient (1-)3,4,9
>99%) shorter mean time.
The mean (waiting time) based on the samples answering questions 5 and 6 for
bus line A is shorter than waiting time of bus line B. However, existence of heteroscedasticity in the sample does not allow concluding that the type of bus line
is a significant factor. In question 10 (a), mean waiting time in the case of bus line B
is longer than that of line A, indicating less tolerance by the users as long as waiting
is concerned. In question 7, bus line type does not affect the answers.
In contrast to passengers of line B, passengers of line A spend everyday shorter
waiting time at the bus stop. It appears from the answers, that passengers perceive
scheduled headway of each bus line rather accurately, even if they do not have
direct information about it. They evaluate the degree of schedule adherence and
adapt their own trip schedule to the mean headway for each line. The time they
are prepared to wait at the bus stop is not related to the mean headway of the
bus line. Deviations between actual bus lines operation and scheduled headways
create problems and affect their activities. In cases where these activities require
30
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Table 4. Combined (Inbound-Outbound) Statistical Results (t-test)

a precise schedule, passengers begin to consider alternative bus lines, taxi service,
a combination both, or even walking.
Usually, after carrying out a test of statistical importance, it is desirable to know
which factor contributed to the results. In our case, we pay special attention to the
differences between the answers. Analysis can, of course, be limited to the simple
t-tests, in order to compare all possible pairs of the sample means. However, such
a procedure would depend on chance.
Post hoc comparison techniques, on the other hand, take into account specifically
the fact that more than two sample means may be examined. Post hoc stands for
the logical error of believing that temporal succession implies a relation. These
post hoc comparisons were made using Scheffé’s and Duncan’s tests. Scheffé’s
test performs simultaneous joint comparisons in pairs for all possible combinations of means in pairs using the F sampling distribution. This test is considered to
be “conservative” (Clarke and Cooke 1998); therefore, its usage helps to find out
significant (at a level a = 0.05) errors occurring in multiple comparisons.
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At the same time, there is a chance that important differences, possibly existing,
may not occur. To limit this possibility, a more tolerant test (Duncan) is performed.
Duncan’s test makes comparisons in pairs using a stepwise order of comparison,
setting a protection level for the rate of error regarding the collection of data sets,
rather than rate of error for individual tests.
Tests mentioned above made it clear that a significant factor differentiating the
answers is the headway of each bus line. To find a quantitative expression (function) of that differentiation, Discriminant Analysis was used. This type of analysis
describes the differentiating features from observing known populations and tries
to find “discriminants” of which numerical values are such that the observations
(responses) are as distinct as possible (Fisher 1936).
Responses to questions 3, 4, 5, 6 and 9 were treated as quantitative variables.
Analysis indicates that 57-74 percent of the answers at the basis of bus lines A
and B with confidence coefficient of (1-)3,4,5,6,9 >95% . Wilk’s Lambda found to be
ranging between 0.78 and 0.88, depending on the type of question. Wilk’s Lambda
([0,1]) is a multivariate test of significance, sometimes called the U-statistic, with
values close to 0 indicating that the group means are different and values close to
1 indicating the group means are not different.
The most felicitous analysis was found to be the one referring to question 3 (“In
your usual schedule, how long do you estimate you will be willing to wait for the
bus?”), in which the discriminant percentage of the questions was 74 percent,
with Wilk’s Lambda 0.78 with a confidence coefficient of (1-)3 >99%. The linear
discriminant function for each of the two bus lines was:
Bus line A: y3,A = -4.415 + 0.661x

(1)

Bus line B: y3,B = -7.878 + 0.918x

(2)

where: y is the classification variable of bus line
x is answer to the question no.3, in minutes
For a specific x, the larger of the two classification variables y3,A, y3,B classifies the
user to the one or the other bus line. The discriminant line is made up by the parts
of the two functions that give higher scores before and after the point of intersection (dashed line, Figure 1). The two lines intersect at a point with an abscissa equal
to 13.45 min. Thus, a user whose response is less than 13.45, is more likely to use
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line A. Users of line A, compared to those of line B, spend less of their time at the
bus stop. This indicates that the users of the more frequent line A perceive their
waiting time through the assumption that line A has a higher headway. Passengers
of line B, on the contrary have a better perception of the actual headway of the
particular line.

Figure 1. Bus Line A & B Discriminant Functions
Results of previous test-controls are summarized as follows:
• Passengers of both lines in the outbound direction, that is, those mainly
returning home in the afternoon, answered that they are less tolerant
compared to answers given to the same question while making the morning inbound trip. For passengers returning home, the reliability of service is
evaluated (perceived) as more important than is in the inbound trip.
• Headway analysis showed a large degree of schedule deviation (up to 90%
–95%). This implies about ±7.5 minutes for line A and ±16.5 minutes for B
(extreme negative signs indicate a bunching). Passengers perceived average
times of: 10.7 and 14 minutes, respectively. Passengers of the most frequent
line (A) perceive greater delays than actual ones, while passengers of the less
frequent line (B) perceive smaller schedule deviations than actual ones. This
phenomenon is known as “time drag,” in which waiting time seems longer
than it actually is (Moreau 1992). A possible explanation for this would be
that the perception of time from an unreliable bus service follows a logarithmic trend (i.e. during the first waiting minutes, time “runs” faster).
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Model Proposal and Development
To investigate further the claim of the logarithmic-like relationship as suggested in
the previous chapter, the following simple calculations were undertaken. The basic
relationship is expressed as follows:
Ti = ki HiL

(3)

where: Ti : the users’ perception of deviation as stated in the interview for bus line
i.
Hi : headway of bus line i
ki : coefficient of proportion, independent of the bus line’s headway,
related to bus line i user’s characteristic, the purpose of traveling,
the
frequency of bus usage, travel time, etc.
L : unknown numerical variable
For bus line , eq(3) becomes: TA = kA HAL and for bus line , eq(3) becomes:
TB = kB HBL
In our case, users of bus lines  and  have similar characteristics (purpose of
travelling, frequency of bus usage, etc) and this means kA= kB

(4)

Observed HA=7.68min and HB=17.65min. TA and TB can be derived from the
answers collected in the survey and refer to the perception of schedule deviation
of bus lines A and B, respectively.
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By substituting in (4) HA, HB and the values given in question no.3 (Table 4), i.e.
TA=11.27 and TB=15.66:

(5)

And finally:
T=kH2/5

T, H in min

(6)

The above model was iteratively fitted to the survey responses, i.e. the values of the
responses to those questions that combine on the same basis, passenger perception with actual bus line performance. These are questions no. 3,4 and 5 (Table 4).
Coefficient of proportion k for passengers of bus lines A and B is then derived as
the minimum square root error solution to (6), using the survey data for each pair
of Tquest no.(3),(4),(5)(A),(B) and H(A),(B).
The resultant form of the model is then:
T(H) = 4.7H2/5

T, H in min

(7)

The rate of T vs. H, r(h) derives from:

H in min, r in min(-3/5)

(8)

where: r(H) is a decaying function of H, signifying the diminishing impact of a
headway increase on the perception of schedule deviation.
The plotted results of the (7) and (8) are shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Perceived Deviation and its Rate of Change vs. Headway
(Factors 4.7, 1.88 concern users of specific bus lines A & B as described above)

Conclusions
Bus line users traveling in stochastic transportation networks, having little knowledge of the exact schedule timetables, usually base their travel decisions on the
empirical perception of time in order to organize their own time schedules. The
perception of the mean waiting time and its variances determines how service
reliability is evaluated by the user and, subsequently, the user’s attitude towards
the way of traveling. Knowing the way passengers perceive schedule deviations
and the resultant variations of their waiting time would help the management of
transportation in achieving operational effectiveness. Having interviewed passengers waiting at bus stops, it was verified that a (the) significant factor related to the
perception of waiting time deviations was the headway, yet not linearly.
On the basis of the proposed model, deviation is perceived as a function of the
headway H raised to the number of 2/5. The curve expressing the relation between
perceived deviation (leading to the so-called “time drag”) and headway has a logarithmic shape, while the curve expressing the rate of the perception of deviation
has that of a negative exponential. The greater the headway, the greater deviation
the users perceive, but at a diminishing rate. So, if an operator wishes to upgrade
the quality of those services related to passenger waiting time, it is important to
keep bus lines even with greater headways reliable and then try to achieve shorter
headways. Once a bus line with shorter headway is in operation, it should be
strictly reliable, as passengers become indignant about unreliability of bus lines
with shorter headways.
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Limitations and Future Work
Natural limitations in this research concern the basic sample of only two specific
bus lines, the fact that bus operators may have incorporated some manual headway control into schedules—a thing unknown to us, and that passengers had no
credible source available of information about bus line scheduled operations. By
implementing intelligent transport systems such as real-time information at bus
stops and automatic headway control methods, new and challenging conditions
appear in transportation environment.
Suggestions for further investigation on the subject could involve research on different types of bus lines and networks, such as peripheral instead of radical bus
lines or bus lines using exclusive lanes. The question of how reliable (in quantitative terms) a service should be before it is made more frequent, regarding cost and
benefits of alternative operational strategies, is also another interesting direction
of research.
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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of Virginia’s policy of exempting hybrid-electric vehicles from minimum occupancy requirements on state HOV lanes. Virginia registration statistics are used to compile hybrid market shares on a county level to compare
the impact of HOV lane access to other socioeconomic variables. The HOV incentive
is shown to have a significant impact in Northern Virginia, but not in the Hampton
Roads area. The paper also addresses the criticisms and potential unintended consequences of the incentive policy, including whether it has impacted the “green” image
of the hybrid in Virginia.

Introduction
This article examines the impact of HOV lane exemption policies for hybrid-electric vehicles, focusing primarily on the state of Virginia. Sales and general interest
in Hybrid Electric Vehicles (HEVs) has risen steadily in recent years in response to
rising fuel costs and increased concern about pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. Hybrid vehicles utilize the same gasoline fuel infrastructure as conventional
Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) vehicles, yet represent a distinct technology
improvement that can provide greater fuel economy and reduced emissions for
equivalent vehicle performance by recapturing energy normally lost during break39
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ing (U.S. Department of Energy 2007). As an energy efficiency technology, HEVs
also address positive externalities associated with resource management, the
environment, and energy security, which are not taken into account by the market
(Jaffe and Stavins 1994). In addition, HEVs face barriers to diffusion that are common to many new cost-saving technologies, such as high initial unit costs, lack of
knowledge by potential adopters, high discount rates for future cost savings, and
low consumer risk tolerance (Jaffe and Stavins 1994; Stoneman and Diederen 1994;
Argote and Epple 1990). To account for these externalities and barriers to adoption, the U.S. Federal Government and many state governments have offered a
variety of incentives and privileges to consumers who purchase hybrids and alternative fuel vehicles (U.S. Department of Energy 2007), one of the most notable
being an exemptions from minimum vehicle occupancy requirements in High
Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) carpool lanes. This privilege can result in considerable
time savings for commuters who purchase hybrids.
Where HOV lanes exist and have sufficient excess capacity, allowing hybrids or
alternative fuel vehicles on HOV lanes with a single occupant provides a means of
promoting adoption with almost no direct marginal costs to taxpayers, other than
the cost of publicizing, administering, and enforcing the program. Virginia was the
first state to adopt this policy, starting in 2000, and since 2005 several other states,
including Florida, Georgia, Utah, New York, New Jersey, California and Arizona,
have allowed hybrids on at least some of the state’s HOV lanes (U.S. Department
of Energy 2007). Due to its seven-year history of allowing hybrids on HOV lanes,
Virginia provides an excellent case study of the impact of HOV incentive policies
for hybrids and may provide insights for other jurisdictions considering similar
policy incentives. To that end, this paper examines the background of Virginia’s
HOV lane incentive and its impact on local adoption patterns. It compares the
impact of Virginia’s HOV lane policy to other potential determinants of hybrid
vehicle adoption, including income, environmentalism, and commuting characteristics. Additionally, it looks at the potential for unintended consequences of the
policy and whether there is evidence that HOV incentives have led to a backlash
against the “green” image of hybrids in Virginia.
This paper builds on previous research into the determinants of hybrid vehicle
adoption. Kahn (2007) found that environmentalism (as indicated by Green Party
affiliation) was associated with hybrid ownership, based on regression analysis
of census track-level data in six California cities. Heffner et al. (2005) conducted
detailed interviews with households in Northern California that own HEVs and
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determined that both anticipated cost savings and the “green image” of hybrids
influence purchase decisions. McManus and Berman (2005) analyzed the results
of an online survey taken by 532 hybrid owners and 933 potential owners who
visited the HEV information website HybridCars.com. Their report identified the
desire to save money on gas and reduce pollution as significant motivating factors
for purchasing a hybrid among both sets of respondents. A 2004 marketing survey
by ChangeWave Research concluded that hybrid owners tend to be in the highest
income demographics and are more sensitive to gas prices than environmental
benefits in purchasing their vehicles (ChangeWave Research 2005).
Several more recent studies on hybrid vehicle adoption that also examine the
impact of government incentives have been conducted using sales and registration data for U.S. states. Diamond (2008) conducted cross-sectional regressions
of annual state market share for top-selling hybrid models using RL Polk registration data. The analysis found that average gasoline prices, income, miles traveled,
and environmentalism were all positively related to market share, but that the
presence or values of monetary incentives at the state level was generally weak or
insignificant compared to these other factors. Gallagher and Muehlegger (2008)
analyzed actual sales transaction data provided by JD Power and found a more significant impact from state incentives. However, both studies noted that sales tax
waivers tended to be more significant than income tax credits, and that Virginia’s
HOV incentive appeared to have significantly impacted market share. This paper
further contributes to the literature on incentive policies for hybrids by examining the impact of Virginia’s HOV policy at the local level. It makes use of market
share calculations for individual Virginia cities and counties to explore how the
impact of the HOV incentive on hybrid adoption varied among different jurisdictions within the state, taking into account local variations in other factors such as
income, environmentalism, and commuting habits.

Virginia HOV System Background
Virginia’s incentive policy stems from a law predating the introduction of hybrids,
which authorized the HOV lane exemption for a variety of alternative fuel vehicles.
When hybrids were first introduced in the U.S. in 2000, the state Department
of Motor Vehicles—under pressure from consumers and lawmakers—allowed
hybrids (which run on gasoline and are therefore not technically alternative fuel
vehicles) to also qualify for the program (Morrison and Counts 2005). Access to
HOV lanes is controlled by issuing hybrids and other alternative fuel vehicles a
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“special clean fuel” license plate, which can be seen by police enforcing HOV rules.
These plates provide single-occupant access to HOV lanes in two major areas:
Northern Virginia, which boarders Washington, DC, and the Hampton Roads
area, which includes Newport News, Norfolk, Chesapeake, and Virginia Beach.
The Northern Virginia HOV lanes include three major highways—along Interstate Route 66 (I-66), the Dulles Toll Road (VA 267) and Interstate Route 95/395
(I-95/395).1 The law authorizing the exemption originally contained a two-year
sunset clause, but until 2006 it was renewed for two additional years each time it
had been set to expire. In 2006, lawmakers renewed the exemption for only one
additional year, but ended single-occupant access for hybrids purchased after June
30, 2006, on the I- 95/395 HOV lanes in response to concerns about overcrowding.
In 2007 and 2008, the law was extended only on an annual basis; it is currently set
to expire on June 30, 2009 (Virginia Department of Transportation 2008).
The map in Figure 1 shows the general locations of the Hampton Roads and
Northern Virginia HOV networks. The map in Figure 2 shows the highways that
make up the Northern Virginia HOV network.
On VA 267 and Interstate 66 (outside of I-495), HOV lanes consist of the leftmost highway lane in each direction and are not physically separated from the
rest of the highway. During the morning rush hours, these lanes are restricted to
HOV-2 (two or more occupants required) in the inbound direction, switching to
HOV-2 outbound during the evening rush hour. Along I-66 between I-495 and
the Washington, DC border, the entire highway is restricted to HOV-2 inbound
in the morning (with non-HOV traffic permitted outbound only), and HOV-2
only for all outbound traffic in the afternoon (with non-HOV traffic permitted
inbound). The most extensive HOV lane network is the 27-mile segment along
Interstate I-95/395. The I-95/395 HOV lanes consist of a reversible two-lane segment that is separated from the main highway with limited access points, open
to inbound (northbound towards Washington, DC) traffic in the morning and
outbound traffic in the evening. Traffic is restricted to HOV-3 (three or more
passengers required) during the morning and evening rush hours. Of these three
HOV systems, the I-95/395 HOV lanes handle the most traffic and offer the most
significant percentage time savings (approximately 50%) compared to non-HOV
traffic (Morrison and Counts 2005). Hampton Roads has HOV lanes on several of
the main highways, but time savings and traffic volume on the HOV network are
much lower than in Northern Virginia (The Marketing Source 2002).
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Figure 1. Virginia HOV lanes

Figure 2. Northern Virginia HOV Lanes

Criticism and Unintended Consequences
Since its inception, Virginia’s HOV exemption rule for hybrids has been the subject
of considerable debate. Originally, the practice was in violation of Federal highway
regulations for HOV lanes on interstate highways, which mandated that HOV
lanes were only for high occupancy vehicles (Federal Highway Adminsitration
2005). This debate was ended by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which authorized
states to allow HOV exemptions for hybrids and other clean fuel vehicles. However, critics in newspaper editorials, opinion pieces, and internet discussion boards
point out that the incentive policy runs counter to other policies designed to
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promote energy efficient practices such as carpooling and the use of mass transit
(Ginsberg 2006). Some of the most vehement criticism of hybrid HOV drivers
is found on discussion boards devoted to carpooling and ridesharing. One such
message board, Slug-Line.com, contains over 2,800 mostly negative postings in 88
separate threads devoted to hybrids in the HOV lanes, with topics such as “hybrid
hate,” “anti-hybrid road rage,” and “tired of choking on hybrid fumes.”2
One common complaint by critics is that single-occupant hybrid commuters in
HOV lanes actually consume more gasoline per mile, on average, than carpoolers in less efficient vehicles with two or three passengers (Kuehnel 2006). By this
criterion, hybrids would have to achieve a fuel economy of over 60 mpg to justify
access to the HOV lanes that normally require two vehicle occupants, based on
an average fuel economy of 29.5 mpg for passenger automobiles in 2006 (National
Highway Transit Safety Administration 2006). This comparison may be partially
valid, but the broader environmental impact of the policy is more difficult to
determine and depends both on the percentage of hybrid drivers who would have
commuted alone in the non-HOV lanes otherwise and the extent to which solo
hybrid commuters also use their hybrids for non-commuting trips on evenings
and weekends in place of less fuel efficient vehicles. Virginia has not conducted
sufficient survey research to determine whether hybrid ownership has directly
impacted carpooling or mass transit ridership in Virginia. However, a 2005 Virginia
Department of Transportation Study concluded that hybrids accounted for 19
percent of traffic on the I-95 HOV corridor during the morning rush hour, and
that this additional traffic had pushed the HOV lanes beyond their design capacity
(Morrison and Counts 2005). It is likely that such increased congestion in the HOV
lanes would serve as a disincentive to carpooling.
There is also an equity issue, since the HOV exemption policy favors those who
not only can afford to buy a new car but can also pay the incremental premium to
purchase a hybrid model over an equivalent gasoline-only model. While the availability of more affordable used hybrids should increase over time, Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) records in May 2007 indicated that used vehicles
still accounted for less than 15 percent of the total number of hybrids titled.
The combination of HOV lane overcrowding and backlash by carpoolers could
potentially promote a more negative image of hybrid owners in Virginia, as compared to a generally positive image of hybrid owners in other parts of the country
as environmentally-conscious consumers. To the extent that this phenomenon
occurs, it may serve as a disincentive to consumers in the Northern Virginia area
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who do not desire HOV lane access but might otherwise have considered a hybrid
for the positive environmental or “green” image it connotes.
The remainder of this paper addresses several basic research questions that arise
from Virginia’s experience with its HOV lane incentive. First, it explores whether
the HOV incentive has been effective in promoting adoption of hybrids in Northern Virginia and Hampton Roads and how the effect of the policy compares to
other socioeconomic factors. Second, it explores whether there is evidence that
the policy has tarnished the “green” image of the hybrid in Virginia.

Geographical Analysis of Virginia Adoption Patterns
Statistics on new hybrid market share (new hybrids as a percentage of all new
vehicles registered) for all Virginia counties and independent cities were used to
test the impact of HOV lane policies in promoting adoption compared to other
factors. The Virginia DMV provided basic data on every hybrid registered in the
state as of May 31, 2007, including the automobile make, model, model year, original title date, and garaged jurisdiction (county or independent city).3 Using this
database, the numbers of new and used hybrid vehicles titled in each county and
independent city were calculated each year for Virginia Fiscal Years4 2001 through
2006 (FY01-06) and for the first three quarters of FY07. The DMV also provided a
separate data set with the total number of new and used vehicles titled each fiscal
year for each jurisdiction, which allowed the calculation of market share. The decision to analyze market share by fiscal year was driven primarily by the way that the
DMV provided the data on total numbers of vehicles titled for each jurisdiction.
However, the use of fiscal year was also convenient because it corresponded nicely
with the change in the HOV policy for I-95/395 starting on July 1, 2006.
Figures 3 and 4 show the relative market share (given as a percentage) of new
hybrids among counties in Northern Virginia and in the entire state, respectively,
from FY01-06.
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the dramatic difference in market share between counties
adjacent to the Northern Virginia HOV lanes from those in the rest of the state.
Stafford County, which includes the southern terminus of the I-95 HOV lanes, had
the highest market share in the state for each individual year and for the combined
period from FY01 through FY06. In FY06 (the year before the I-95/395 exemption
ended), almost 6 percent of all new car registrations for Stafford County were for
hybrid vehicles. Presumably, the high hybrid market shares in Northern Virginia
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Figure 3. Hybrid (HEV) Market Share Percentages
in Northern Virginia, FY01-06

Figure 4. Hybrid (HEV) Market Share Percentages
in Virginia Counties, FY01-06
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are directly related to the time-savings value of the HOV exemption for commuters in these counties. The impressive market share in the Northern Virginia
HOV corridors is in sharp contrast to lackluster market share in the remainder of
the state. Despite the apparent impact of the HOV incentive policy in Northern
Virginia, there is little graphical evidence that the policy impacted market share in
the Hampton Roads area. This apparent discrepancy will be discussed further in
the following sections.
It is important to note that the market share is based on new hybrids as a percentage of new vehicles, so this comparison already takes into account the fact that
consumers in more affluent counties or cities are more likely to purchase new cars
(versus used cars) than in less affluent jurisdictions. Figure 5 shows a geographical
representation of market share percentages after correcting for income (dividing
the market share by median county income), illustrating that the high market
share for hybrids along the I-95/395 and I-66 HOV corridors is not strictly a function of higher consumer income in Northern Virginia.

Figure 5. Hybrid (HEV) Market Share Normalized by Income, FY01-06
Another indication of the impact of the I-95/395 HOV exemption is the change in
hybrid sales patterns in Northern Virginia after the exemption ended for hybrids
purchased after June 30, 2006. Market share for the first nine months of FY07
dropped dramatically in Stafford and Prince William counties compared to FY06.
The relative ratios of FY07 to FY06 sales in Virginia counties and cities are shown
in Figure 6.
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Figure 6. Ratios of FY07 to FY06 Hybrid (HEV) Sales

Regression Analysis of Virginia Cities and Counties
The significance of the HOV lane incentive compared to other socioeconomic determinants was explored further via cross-sectional regressions of annual market share
of Virginia counties and independent cities. The basis for this cross-sectional methodology is described in Diamond (2008), where it is used to test for the significance
of incentives using state aggregate market share. The significance of the presence of
or close proximity to an HOV lane was tested, along with several other demographic
variables for each county or city, using the following model specification:

This specification is extremely basic due to the limited amount of control data
available at the local level. The percentage of votes for Green Party presidential
candidate Ralph Nader in the 2000 presidential election was chosen as a proxy
for environmentalism in the absence of a more direct local proxy such as the
Green Planning Capacity Index used by Diamond (2008) or per-capita Sierra Club
memberships used by Gallagher and Muehlegger (2008). However, the choice of
Green Party votes is consistent with Kahn (2007), who uses Green Party registration percentages as a proxy for environmentalism. Because Virginia does not track
individual party membership, actual election results were used instead.5
Mean commute time served as a proxy for relative commute distance, under the
assumption that a further commute would provide a greater incentive to pur48
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chase a more fuel-efficient vehicle. Actual survey data on commute distance was
not available at the county and city level for Virginia. While commute time proved
significant in the regression, congestion may artificially inflate commute time for a
given distance in urban areas.
Average gas prices proved significant at predicting hybrid market share at the state
levels in previous studies (Diamond 2008; Gallagher and Muehlegger 2008), but it
was difficult to incorporate gas prices into the Virginia analysis. Detailed historical
average gas prices at the Virginia county and city levels were not readily available,
although several services, such as Gasbuddy.com and VAgasprices.com, provide
daily price data from a selection of gas stations within each locality. A county-level
plot of daily gasoline prices from Gasbuddy.com on June 6, 2007, showed that
average county gas prices varied between $2.82 and $3.11, with a standard deviation of only 4.5 cents per gallon (Gasbuddy 2007). However, variations between
individual stations in the same county were almost as much as variations between
county averages. In one attempt to use the June 6 county gas prices as a control,
prices were statistically significant in some years, but with a negligible (and, in
some cases, negative) effect.6
Table 1 provides a description of the variables and data sources.
Table 1. Description of Variables for Virginia Hybrid Analysis
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Table 2 provides a summary of the data used for each variable.
Table 2. Summary of Variables for Virginia Hybrid Analysis

In FY07, the HOV dummy variable for Northern Virginia was adjusted to remove
counties containing or adjacent to the I-95/395 HOV lanes, where new hybrids
were no longer entitled to single-occupant HOV lane access. Table 3 lists the counties represented by the HOV dummy variables.
Table 3. Virginia HOV Counties and Cities7

The regression was performed using an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) specification.
A Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity in STATA indicated
significant heteroskedasticity problems for jurisdictions with higher marketshare.
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The presence of multiple zero values in the dependent market share variables
(indicating jurisdictions that had no hybrids titled for that fiscal year) precluded
the use of a log or Box-Cox transformation to reduce the effect. Instead, the results
include heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors generated in STATA for the OLS
regression. Table 4 lists regression results for each fiscal year.
Median household income, Green Party voting percentage, and mean commute
time were statistically significant in explaining hybrid market share for all years
except FY01. Of these three variables, Green Party voting percentage and household income had the strongest effects, with Beta coefficients increasing steadily
each year from FY02 through FY06. In FY06, one standard deviation changes in
Green Party voting percentage and household income were associated with .40
and .33 standard deviation changes, respectively, in new hybrid market share. In
Northern Virginia, the HOV lane incentive was significant at the p < .001 level from
FY02 to FY06, with Beta values between .3 and .5 for each year. After the incentive ended on I-95/395 in FY07, the presence of the HOV lane incentive on I-66
and VA-267 remains significant, although the Beta value dropped substantially, to
.17. In Hampton Roads, there was no statistically significant relationship between
HOV lane incentives and new hybrid registration for any year, which is consistent
with the results of the geographic plot analysis in the previous section.
The strength and significance of Green Party voting percentage as a predictor of
market share from FY05 onward also suggests that any “hybrid backlash” that may
have occurred in Northern Virginia was not strong enough to erase the positive
environmental image of the hybrid statewide. To further examine whether this
theorized backlash actually occurred in Northern Virginia, regressions of market
share versus income, commute time, and Green Party voting percentage were
performed only for the 17 counties in Northern Virginia that were impacted by
the HOV lane incentive (where the original HOV_NV dummy variable was equal
to 1). Green Party voting percentage was insignificant until FY04, when it bordered
on significance with Beta values greater than .5. In FY07, after the elimination of
the incentive for new hybrids on I-95/395, it became significant with a Beta value
of .71. Thus, the trends in significance and strength of effect for the environmentalism proxy in Northern Virginia from FY04-FY07 are fairly consistent with the
trends statewide from the original regression. A detailed results table for Northern
Virginia is omitted.
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Conclusions
The geographic and regression analyses of hybrid registration patterns in Northern Virginia and Hampton Roads suggests that HOV lane incentive policies can
significantly impact the adoption of hybrids by consumers, but only under specific
circumstances. The geographic analysis shows that hybrid market share was highest along the I-95/395 corridor—where HOV lanes offer the greatest time savings
for commuters—but less dramatic on I-66 and VA-267. Likewise, the Beta value
for the Northern Virginia HOV dummy in the regression dropped sharply after the
I-95/395 corridor was excluded in FY07.
Surprisingly, the HOV incentive appears to have had no significant impact on
hybrid vehicle market share in the Hampton Roads area. This may be due to a
number of factors, but is most likely due to the nature of the local highway and
HOV lane systems. While HOV lanes provide some degree of time savings in the
Hampton Roads area, the overall traffic congestion and time saved are much less
than on Northern Virginia highways. A 2002 study on attitudes about HOV lanes
in the Hampton Roads area indicated that only 59 percent of Peninsula (Newport
News and Hampton) and 76 percent of Southside (Norfolk and Virginia Beach)
commuters felt that HOV lanes allowed commuters to reach their destinations
faster than non-HOV lanes, compared to an almost universal appreciation of
potential HOV time savings among Northern Virginia commuters (The Marketing Source 2002). Average distance traveled in the Hampton Roads HOV lanes
was only 15 miles, compared to 25 mile HOV commutes in Northern Virginia,
and much of the traffic congestion in Hampton Roads is actually the result of
several narrow bridges and tunnels (none of which have HOV lanes) that connect
neighboring counties. Additionally, the mean commute time for Hampton Roads
HOV counties is significantly less than for Northern Virginia HOV counties—24.8
minutes versus 33.3 minutes—providing less of an incentive for adopting any time
savings measure in the first place (U.S.Census Bureau 2000).
The significance of control variables for income, Green Party votes, and commute
time is consistent with the theory and previous findings that individuals who have
higher incomes and longer commutes and are more environmentally conscious
are more likely to become early adopters of new vehicle efficiency technologies,
ceteris paribus. In the case of HOV lane incentives, the effect of income may be
amplified because the value of the time savings from HOV access is proportional
to the value or utility that individuals place on their time. Therefore, individuals
who earn more per hour might be likely to place a greater value on the incentive.
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The fact that Green Party voting percentage was the strongest and most significant predictor of market share from FY05 onward statewide and still significant in
Northern Virginia (based on the separate Northern Virginia regressions), particularly in FY07, also suggests that any “hybrid backlash” that may have occurred did
not erase the positive environmental image of the hybrid.
Even before FY07, the relative effect of Northern Virginia HOV lane access on
market share had begun to decrease compared to other factors, perhaps in anticipation of the incentive’s eventual expiration. The Beta values for the Northern
Virginia HOV incentive peaked in FY04 then dropped each of the following years.
Conversely, the Beta values for the coefficient of the household income variable
increased from .21 in FY04 to .32 in FY05 and remained steady through FY07,
while the Beta values for the Green Party voting percentage variable continued to
increase, reaching a value of .61 by FY07.
The main findings of this research are that 1) Virginia’s HOV lane incentive appears
to have had a significant impact on hybrid vehicle adoption in Northern Virginia,
but not in Hampton Roads; 2) the impacts of HOV incentive policies in general
appear to be very sensitive to local conditions and the potential for time savings
on a particular HOV corridor; and 3) the presence of the HOV incentive did not
appear to diminish the impact of other factors—particularly environmental consciousness—on adoption of hybrid vehicles. While this paper looked specifically
at Virginia, it is reasonable that evaluations of incentive policies in other states
would highlight similar trade-offs between effectiveness, equity and unintended
consequences.
Other states have already incorporated limitations into their own HOV policies.
California limited the total number of solo HOV access permits to 85,000 to prevent overcrowding, although there is still anecdotal evidence that the policy has
resulted in HOV lane congestion and sharply inflated prices that dealers charged
for hybrids as the state neared the limit on permits (McKenzie 2007). Utah offers
single passenger express lane access to all drivers willing to pay a $500 per year fee,
but charges hybrid owners only $50 for the fee (U.S. Department of Energy 2007).
While this may address the equity issue and help prevent any hybrid image backlash, it may also dampen the perceived utility of the incentive by explicitly limiting
its value to $450 per year. Other states have qualified HOV and other incentives
with minimum gas mileage standards or periodic impact reviews.
Finally, an important consideration of the HOV exemption policy, compared
to “one-time” incentives such as rebates or credits, is that it creates a small but
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extremely vocal group of “entrenched stakeholders”—hybrid owners—who have
a significant personal stake in continuing the policy and are likely to fight strongly
against any attempt to discontinue it by lawmakers or state agencies. Although
this concern is common to all incentives that offer a continuing benefit over time,
HOV access—more so than monetary incentives—may also influences residents’
long-term decisions on where they live and work, encouraging choices that cannot
be easily undone. Thus, the unique nature of the HOV incentive and the debate
that the policy has caused in Virginia should give pause to other states considering
similar programs. At the very least, policymakers would be wise to include feedback and data collection requirements into incentive legislation to help assess and
manage the impact of incentive policies.
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Endnotes
1

I-95 becomes I-395 between the I-495 Beltway and the Washington, DC border.

2

The term “slug line” refers to the anonymous ridesharing lines that form at several HOV park-and-ride lots in Northern Virginia. During rush hour, single drivers pick up anonymous passengers, known as “slugs,” to gain access to the HOV
lanes.

3

The data set excluded vehicles that were purchased in Virginia but removed
from the state prior to May 2007. This may under-report the market share values
slightly, but it is assumed that this trend affects all counties equally and does not
affect the comparisons of market share between counties.

4

The Virginia fiscal year runs from July 1 through June 30.

5

The 2000 presidential election was chosen because of the strong Green Party
showing (2.2% statewide) compared to other years.
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6

The negative gas price effect may be due to zone pricing strategies used by gasoline distributors set prices based in a manner that optimizes profits in specific
geographic regions (Bayles 2001). While specific pricing strategies are held as
trade secrets, prices are generally based on factors affecting demand such as
commuting patterns and income. In the outlying Northern Virginia HOV counties where commuters have the choice of solo commuting, carpooling, or rail
transport, prices may be kept lower to encourage automobile commuting and
maintain demand. Since these suburban areas include the counties that benefit
most from the HOV privileges, the zone pricing system may result in a spurious
inverse correlation between gas prices and hybrid sales.

7

Commute time was not provided for Alleghany County.
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Project NPV, Positive Externalities,
Social Cost-Benefit Analysis—
The Kansas City Light Rail Project
Sudhakar Raju, Rockhurst University

Abstract
The Heartland Light Rail project represents Kansas City’s biggest infrastructural
investment in decades. The ballot initiative for the light rail project was voted down
three times until it was finally approved in November 2006. Using best estimates of
construction costs, operating expenses and federal funding, I estimate the net present value (NPV) of the project to be negative $343 million. From a standard NPV
perspective the Kansas City light rail transit (LRT) system is unlikely to break even.
However, if the negative externalities of auto travel and the positive externalities
associated with light rail are properly accounted for in a comprehensive social costbenefit framework, investment in the Kansas City LRT system becomes an increasingly feasible option.

Introduction
In November 2006, after several previous failed attempts, voters in Kansas City
approved a measure for the construction of a light rail transit (LRT) system that
would be partly financed by a 3/8-cent sales tax for 25 years. According to the official ballot language, the plan proposes the construction of a new $1 billion, 27-mile
Heartland Light Rail system. The plan also proposes enlarging the light rail system’s
service area by employing a green fleet of 60 electric shuttles that would provide
connecting transit service to nearby job and shopping centers.
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Kansas City and Transportation
During the 1990s, Kansas City embarked on a widespread strategic planning initiative. A key recommendation of the initiative involved the city’s transportation
system. Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) data indicated that the poor
quality of Kansas City roads imposed annual vehicle operation costs of $651 on
Kansas City drivers1—the highest in the nation’s major cities outside California.
Data from the 2003 national Consumer Expenditure Survey indicated that among
major metropolitan areas, Kansas City residents spent about 20 percent of their
budget on transportation—the fifth highest in the nation. Kansas City offers no
real alternatives to driving and, with continued growth, transportation is projected to become even more time-consuming and costly. As a result, a key recommendation of the planning initiative was for the development of a light rail transit
system to “enhance the movement of people, to protect clean air, and to protect
the natural environment … and the promotion of more clustered development
along transit corridors.”2
Kansas City is actually composed of two cities—Kansas City, Missouri and Kansas
City, Kansas. Kansas City, Missouri is, by itself, the largest city in Missouri. The combined population of the greater Kansas City metropolitan area is close to 2 million.
Once known primarily for agriculture and manufacturing, Kansas City today has
a diversified economic base composed of telecommunications, banking, finance,
and service-based industries. Kansas City is also a transportation hub and a major
national distribution center. Transportation is, therefore, central to the continued
development of Kansas City.
Notwithstanding the importance of transportation for Kansas City’s economic
development, recent investment in transportation infrastructure in Kansas
City has been poor. In a study conducted by the Mid-America Regional Council
(MARC), a regional public policy research organization located in Kansas City,
Kansas City ranked at the bottom of a group of peer cities in terms of public transportation financing. The only public transit offered by the city is bus services. But
even this service is underinvested; in fact, Kansas City would have to double its bus
services to reach the average of its peer cities.
Due to the extensive highway projects implemented in Kansas City during the
1970s and 1980s, Kansas City possesses the most freeway lane miles per capita of
all large urbanized areas in the United States and the fourth highest total roadway
miles per person.3 Even though Kansas City ranks high in the number of roadway
miles per person, its roads are in worse condition than national and peer city aver60
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ages. The Road Information Program’s (TRIP’s) 2004 Bumpy Roads Ahead report
found that Kansas City’s “poor” pavement conditions significantly exceeded
national averages, and Kansas City had a smaller percentage of roads classified as
“good.” In addition, overall pavement conditions have notably deteriorated since
2000.
Transportation by automobile is, by far, the preferred mode of transportation in
Kansas City, and recent studies indicate that reliance on automobiles is continuing
to grow. More than 93 percent of all trips are by automobile, of which 83 percent
are single-occupancy trips and 10 percent are carpool trips. About 4 percent work
from home, 1 percent walk to work, and public transit accounts for the remaining
1 percent.
The extensive roadway system in Kansas City offsets the excessive reliance on
automobiles; thus, congestion is not a major problem. However, there is significant
congestion during peak periods, and nearly all studies are in agreement that congestion is growing. The 2001 Travel Time Study conducted by MARC found that
congested travel as a percentage of peak vehicle miles traveled increased from 5
percent in 1982 to 32 percent in 2002. However, this still compares very favorably
to other urban areas in which congested travel increased far more substantially,
from 24 percent in 1982 to 65 percent in 2002. The low-density urban form of Kansas City means that travel distances in Kansas City are longer. The average vehicle
miles of travel (VMT) per person in Kansas City was 28.65, whereas the average for
metropolitan areas of similar size was 24.04 VMT per person each day.4 However,
the relatively lower congestion in Kansas City results in greater travel speeds and
shorter travel times. The MARC 2001 Travel Time Study found that even though
average travel speeds steadily increased, “there are several routes where congestion is an increasing problem. This is evident in that there is a large percentage of
routes and segments with delay … and several of the most highly traveled routes in
the region have significantly more delay than in previous studies.” A similar study
by the Missouri Department of Transportation found that of the 10 most heavilycongested sections of the urban Missouri interstate highways, 7 are located in
Kansas City.5

The Heartland Rail System
Planning for the Kansas City LRT system began in the 1990s. The Technology Work
Team considered six technology options—improved bus service, bus rapid transit
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with dedicated guideway (such as in Ottawa or Curitiba), electrified bus rapid
transit (as in Lille, France or Mexico City), electrified street car, monorail and light
rail—and settled on light rail as the preferred technology with electric bus transit
as a second option.
The Heartland Rail system would serve some of Kansas City’s densest residential
neighborhoods in the mid- and south-town areas. The proposed system alignment runs through downtown Kansas City, serving an employment corridor with
250,000 jobs. The primary market that would be served by the proposed light rail
system is work trips though strong connections to cultural and shopping centers
would result in a strong secondary market. During peak weekday morning and
evening periods, service is proposed to be provided every 12 minutes.

Capital Costs, Operating Costs, and Funding for the
Heartland Light Rail Project
The Heartland Rail system, as proposed, would constitute one of the biggest infrastructural investments in Kansas City history. Detailed estimates of capital costs,
cash inflows, and cash outflows for the project is provided in the Central Business
Corridor (CBC) Transit Plan. The essential features of the project and the underlying project assumptions of the CBC Transit plan are summarized in Table 1.
The CBC plan assumes that the project would be funded by three major sources.
Federal funding of $593 million was assumed to cover 60.50 percent of the capital
costs of the project. A 3/8-cent sales tax for 25 years was assumed to generate $29
million in the first year and a total of $878 million over the 25-year tax period. The
project would also be funded by a $195 million, 19-year, 7.70 percent bond issue,
which would result in interest payments of $19.87 million annually. The funding
for the project would become effective on April 1, 2009.

The Financial Economics of the Heartland Light Rail System—
Project Analysis
While detailed estimates of capital costs, cash inflows, and cash outflows over the
25-year life of the light rail system are provided in the Central Business Corridor
(CBC) Transit Plan, there is no attempt to provide an economic or financial analysis of the project. The project inflow and outflow estimates provided by the CBC
plan over the 25-year life of the project are shown in Table 2.
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Table 1. Project Assumptions
Project Life
•  Capital Period
•  Operating Period

25 years
8 years   (Year 1 – Year 8)
17 years (Year 9 – Year 25)

Estimated (Inflation Adjusted) Capital Costs

$981

Base Estimate of Annual Operating/Maintenance Costs
Annual Growth in Operating/Maintenance Cost
Annual Operating/Maintenance Cost in Year 9
($15.20 x [1 + .04]8 = $20.80)
Total Operation and Maintenance Cost (Years 9 - 25)

$15.20 million
4%
$20.80 million
$493

Federal Capital Funding Percentage
Secondary Funds Base Assumption
(Annual Growth Rate 1.80%)

60.50%
$1.50 million

Base Estimate from Sales Taxes
Estimated Annual Growth in Taxes
Tax Period

$29 million
1.80%
25 years

Bond Issue
$195 million
Bond Repayment Period
19 years
Bond Interest Rate
7.50%
Annual Bond Interest Payment 					
		
$19.87 million
($195 million issue, Effective rate of 7.70%, 19 years)
Base Estimate of Fare Revenue (Year 9 of project)

$6.11 million			

Annual Growth Rate in Fare Revenues

1.80%
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Notes: Total Capital Outflows = Capital Costs + Operation & Maintenance + Bond Payment
Total Capital Inflows = Bond Sales + Federal Funds + Secondary Funds + Other Funding + Sales Tax Revenues + Fare Box Revenues +
Interest Earned

Table 2. Project Cost and Revenue Flows (in millions): Estimates Based on CBC Study
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A good starting point for financial analysis is to compute the NPV of the Kansas
City LRT project. For long-term capital projects, the Federal Transit Authority
(FTA) recommends using a project discount rate of 7 percent.6 Using this as the
applicable discount rate, the NPV of the project based on the CBC Transit Plan
estimates turn out to be about $70 million. However, this NPV value is based on
preliminary estimates provided in the CBC Transit Plan and needs to be readjusted
in the light of recent developments and other factors such as inflationary effects.
The most significant revisions to the preliminary estimates are:
• The CBC Transit Plan estimates are based on operating cost assumptions of
$20.80 million. More realistic estimates suggest that operating costs would
probably be in the range of $25-$30 million annually. The mid-point of this
range is used here with the assumption (as in the CBC study) that operating
costs escalate annually at 4 percent.
• The CBC Transit Plan revenue estimates are based on a ½-cent sales tax
assumption. The actual amount approved by Kansas City voters was 3/8
cents. (Thus, actual sales tax revenues earmarked for the project are 25
percent lower.) The lower estimate suggests that a 3/8-cent sales tax would
generate sales tax revenues of $23 million annually. The CBC estimates were
revised to reflect the lower sales tax with the assumption (as in the CBC
study) that sales tax revenues increase by 1.75 percent annually.
The revised estimates are shown in Table 3. The NPV of the project based on the
net cash flows of the project turn out to be -$53.31 million, while the Internal Rate
of Return (IRR) is 10.58 percent7—a clear signal that the project has some inherent
problems.
What is clear from an analysis of the cash flow stream is that the project is heavilydependent on federal funding. Ironically, the only periods in which the project has
any positive cash flow stream are the initial years—the periods when one would
expect the project to run deficits because of high capital costs. This is due to the
fairly high values assumed for federal funding. While capital costs reach a peak in
years 6-8, a bond issue in Year 7 partially offsets some of these capital costs, resulting in a net inflow in Year 7.
The most instructive aspect of the financial analysis is the non-self sustaining
nature of the project in the operating phase covering years 9-25. Net cash flows
in the operating phase of the project are negative in every year of the project. In
principle, the operating phase is somewhat less subject to uncertainty since the
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Notes: Total Capital Outflows = Capital Costs + Operation & Maintenance + Bond Payment
Total Capital Inflows = Bond Sales + Federal Funds + Secondary Funds + Other Funding + Sales Tax Revenues + Fare Box Revenues
Net Cash flow = Total Capital Inflows - Capital Outflows

Table 3. Project Cost and Revenue Flows (in millions): Revised Estimates Based on CBC Study

Journal of Public Transportation, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2008

Project NPV, Positive Externalities, Social Cost-Benefit Analysis

major uncertainty in infrastructural projects tends to center around the substantial initial investment costs. Four major factors determine the economic viability
of the Heartland Light Rail project in the operating phase of the project: operating
and maintenance costs, bond interest payments, sales tax revenues, and fare box
revenues. The effect of each of these variables are analyzed below.
Operating and Maintenance Costs
The budgeted value for operating and maintenance cost in the first year of the K.C.
Light Rail project is $20.80 million. A more realistic estimate, taking into account
factors such as cost escalation and inflation, is $25-$30 million. Using a mid-range
estimate of operating costs, the NPV of the project, as pointed out earlier, turns
out to be negative. Now, suppose one were to give the operating costs of the
project more latitude. What is the lowest value that one could assume for base
operating costs and still end up with a positive value for NPV? Holding everything
else constant, the effect on NPV for different base year operating and maintenance
cost assumptions is reported below.8
Table 4. Project Sensitivity to Base Year Operating &
Maintenance Cost Assumptions

Thus, operating and maintenance costs would have to be lower than $20.33
million at inception of project operation for NPV to be positive. Given that the
current estimate is $25 million, it seems unlikely that operating and maintenance
costs could go as low as $20.33 million. In addition, if the annual percentage
increase in operating costs were higher than 4 percent, the resulting NPV’s would
be even more unfavorable.
Bond Interest Payments
The base estimates are based on partial funding of the Heartland Light Rail Project
through a $195 million, 7.70 percent effective rate, 19-year bond issue in Year 7 of
the project. This results in interest obligations of $19.87 million over 19 years. How
low would interest obligations have to be to result in a break-even NPV?
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The effective interest rate assumed for the Heartland Light Rail bond issue is 7.70
percent. Of course, future interest rates are unknown, but, based on Kansas City’s
current credit rating, an interest rate of 7.70 percent seems reasonable and perhaps even on the higher side. In 2007, Kansas City issued $138 million of general
obligation “GO series 2007A” bonds at a rate of 4.60 percent. All three credit rating
agencies—Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch Ratings—affirmed their belief
in the City’s financial strength. In Table 5, a19-year bond issue of $195 million is
assumed, and the effect of different interest rates and debt servicing levels on
project NPV is computed.
Table 5. Project Sensitivity to Interest Cost Assumptions

Note: The above is based on a $195 million, 19-year bond issue.

It is clear from the sensitivity analysis above that even if long-term interest rates
were to decline to a historical low of 4 percent, the resulting savings in debt servicing costs is insufficient to result in a non-negative NPV. Since long-term interest
rates have historically been around 7.50 percent, it is improbable for much savings
to be realized from a decline in annual debt servicing costs alone.
Suppose we were to consider two other options—increasing the size of the bond
issue or increasing the maturity of the issue. It is important to recognize that size,
maturity, and annual payments are all simultaneously determined, so that changing any one variable affects the value of at least one of the other variables. Now
suppose that the size of the issue was increased from $195 million to some higher
value while maturity of the issue is kept constant. What effect would this have on
the NPV of the project? The results are reported in Table 6.
Clearly, increasing the size of the bond issue worsens the NPV of the project. This
is due to the fact that while a larger bond issue increases the cash inflow in Year
7, it also results in higher debt servicing burdens in the outer years of the project.
In fact, a lower issue size may be the answer, but there may be constraints about
running unacceptably high levels of deficits in the initial years of the project.
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Table 6. Project Sensitivity to Bond Issue Size

Note: The above assumes an effective
funding cost of 7.70 percent and a
maturity of 19 years.

Would increasing the maturity of the bond issue and consequently reducing the
annual debt servicing burden improve the NPV of the project? Suppose the size
of the issue and interest rate remained at $195 million and 7.70 percent, but the
maturity of the issue was increased from 19 to 25 years. The annual debt servicing
burden in this case would decrease from $19.87 million to $17.80 million over the
life of the project, and NPV would improve from the base case NPV of -$53.31 million to -$45 million.
At an extreme, imagine that Kansas City could issue a perpetual bond. Suppose
the issue size is $195 million and the interest rate is 7.70 percent. In this case, the
annuity payments would decline from the base case estimate of $19.87 million per
annum to perpetual annuity payments of $15.02 million ($195m x .0770). This is
the lowest-possible annual debt servicing burden attainable by increasing bond
maturity. However, this would still result in a negative NPV.
The bottom line is this: Declining interest rates and consequently a lower debt
burden would improve NPV, but even at very low interest rates the project does
not break even. Other solutions, such as increasing the size of the bond issue or
increasing the maturity of the bond issue, are either not helpful or do not impact
the NPV in any substantive manner.
Sales Tax Revenues
Initial estimates suggested a ½-cent sales tax earmarked for the Heartland Light
Rail project. Anti-tax sentiment is, however, very strong in Kansas City, and
the final amount approved for the light rail project by Kansas City voters was a
3/8-cent tax for 25 years. The possibility for increasing the sales tax rate is remote;
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the ballot language is very specific, and no significant changes can be made without submitting any changes to a vote. Thus, increasing sales tax revenues to provide additional funding for the project seems unlikely.
Fare Box Revenues
The CBC Transit Plan assumes that fare box revenues in the first operational year
of the project (Year 9) will be around $6.11 million and increase roughly at the rate
of 1.76 percent annually. Demand estimates of ridership are not provided in the
CBC Study, but one can extrapolate from the above value.
Assume a one-way fare price of $3. At a single trip cost of $3, the number of passenger boardings required to generate $6.11 million is about 2.036 million per year
or 8,146 weekday boardings ([$6.11 million] / [$3 x 250 working days]). Assume
for simplicity that 100 percent of the rides are generated by daily round trip commuters. This implies that the number of round trips assumed in the CBC study is
4,073 round-trips per working day. Thus, at a one-way trip price of $3, the fare box
revenue projections will be fulfilled if there are 4,073 daily round-trip commuters
per working day. At a lower fare price of $2 per one-way trip, it can similarly be
determined that the required number of daily round trip commuters is 6,110.
Are the estimates for the number of riders above feasible? One way to answer this
question is to look at the usage for current modes of transportation in Kansas City.
Data from 2005 compiled by the U.S. Census Bureau on “Commuting to Work”
indicates that, of the 914,000 daily commuters in the greater Kansas City metro
area, an overwhelming number (800,0000 or 88%) drove alone; 80,731 (9%) carpooled, and 9,767 (1.07%) used public transportation. Clearly, public transportation is not a preferred transportation mode in Kansas City. However, the assumed
number of daily commuters in the CBC study (4,073)—even given the disappointing number of current daily public transit users—seems low. The proposed Kansas
City light rail system would serve a route corridor estimated to contain 250,000
workers. If 1.63 percent of these workers would choose to use light rail, the ridership estimates in the CBC study would be fulfilled.
Ridership estimates are invariably subject to varying degrees of error. Suppose
the problem is looked at somewhat differently and a related question is asked.
Holding everything else constant, what is the lowest estimate of fare box revenues
that would result in a break even NPV? The model suggests that fare box revenues
of $14.47 million in the first year of the project (or more than twice the revenue
assumed in the CBC Study) would result in a break-even NPV. Annual fare box
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revenues of $14.47 million implies 14,470 round-trips per working day ([$14.47
million] / [$4 round-trip cost x 250 days]). In fact, if the one-way trip cost was
increased to $2.50 from $2, the required number of round-trips per day would be
even lower, at 11,576.9 While options relating to sales tax revenues, bond funding,
maturity of the bond issue, etc., do not seem to hold much promise, estimates for
ridership in Kansas City seem to hold more promise. The reason for this is counterintuitive: the very fact that regions like Kansas City are so poorly served by public
transportation constitutes an advantage in the sense that a good public transit
system has a great deal of potential and much room to grow.
How likely are the ridership estimates above? Does light rail hold promise for Kansas City? In this regard, the experience of St. Louis, Missouri may be instructive.
In fact, if one wanted to use a reference city to draw a comparison with Kansas
City, it would be difficult to come up with a better example than St. Louis. Besides
being geographically proximate, both cities share strong cultural ties. St. Louis
uses a light rail system called MetroLink, which consists of two lines that carry an
average of 49,287 people each weekday. In 2006, a second line (Shrewsbury Line)
opened for operation and within seven months reached ridership targets that
were predicted to be reached eight years later. The St. Louis Dispatch (March 22,
2007) reported that ”average weekday boardings vary month to month but were
up 30,500 in January over the same month last year.… In four of the months since
the line’s inauguration in August, average weekday ridership surpassed 63,000—a
number that transportation planners thought would not be reached until 2015.”
The St. Louis Dispatch argued that commuters, fed up with high gasoline prices and
congested roadways, were finally beginning to consider public transportation as a
serious alternative in the Midwest. If the experience of St. Louis is anything to go
by, public transit’s time may have finally arrived in Kansas City.

Operating Costs, Capital Costs and Federal Funding
for the Heartland Light Rail Project
This section analyzes three aspects of the Heartland Light Rail project that are
subject to a considerable degree of uncertainty—operating costs, capital costs,
and federal funding—and then attempts to use the experience of other U.S. cities to construct realistic cost and funding estimates for the Heartland Light Rail
Project.
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Operating Costs
Most criticism of light rail transit systems center around the high capital and operating costs of LRT systems as compared to bus systems. Table 7 compares operating costs for LRT and bus systems in 12 cities and then computes the operational
cost savings from using a LRT system.
Table 7. Comparison of Operating Expenses per Passenger Mile (PM) for LRT
versus Bus Systems in Selected Cities (2003)

Source: These values are derived from Table 12 (Transit Operating Expenses by Mode, Type of
Service and Function) and Table 19 (Transit Operating Statistics: Service Supplied and Consumed)
of the National Transit Database (NTB) 2003 figures. Annual LRT Operating Savings is computed
by considering the cost advantage of LRT over bus systems and then multiplying the result by the
number of annual LRT passenger miles. Note that negative figures imply that LRT is more expensive than the bus system in that city. Values do not add up exactly because of rounding.10

Clearly, LRT systems in most cities result in lower operating costs than bus systems.11 The results reported above can be reinforced by looking at the most recent
data available from the National Transit Database on annual operating costs for
LRT and bus systems for the U.S. as a whole.
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Table 8. Comparison of Operating Expenses for
Light Rail and Bus Systems in the U.S.

Source: See 2006 National Transit Profile, National Transit Database.

An approximation of the operational cost benefit of LRT systems over bus systems
for the U.S. as a whole can be calculated thus. Since operating cost per LRT passenger mile is $.20 cheaper than bus systems, and LRT accounted for 1,865.7 million
passenger miles, the annual cost savings from LRT systems for the U.S. as a whole
in 2006 was about $373 million.
The bottom line is that operating costs are not a reasonable basis on which to
criticize LRT systems. The empirical evidence is reasonably clear that operating
expenses for LRT systems are lower than bus systems. Based on this experience,
it can reasonably be concluded that, over the long run, operating expenses of the
Heartland Light Rail would probably be lower than bus operating costs.
Capital Costs
Even though operating costs of LRT systems are, on average, lower than bus
systems, the capital costs of light rail systems are another matter. Data on construction costs of light rail systems are not easily available. A recent paper by
Baum-Snow and Kahn (2005) uses a variety of sources to provide an estimate
of construction costs for major rail transit projects.12 The data reveal wide variations in construction costs, depending on the type of construction (see Table 9).
The least-expensive lines are typically those that are built on the surface either
as upgrades of existing railroad lines or on city streets. At the other extreme are
bored tunnel lines, which can cost more than $300 million per mile. For instance,
Seattle’s new LRT system is expected to cost $179 million per mile, while at the
other extreme the LRT systems in Baltimore, Sacramento, and Salt Lake City cost
less than $20 million per mile. Since most of these systems were built at different
points in time, it is difficult to directly compare capital costs. Table 9 reports capital costs for major LRT projects in 2003 dollars13 to facilitate comparison with the
LRT and bus operating cost data reported in Table 7. These capital costs are then
amortized over 30 years at 7 percent per annum and reported in the third column
of the table.14 Utilizing data from Table 7, the last column reports the annual
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Table 9. Estimated Light Rail Capital Costs

Note: The last column is derived from Table 7.

operational cost savings from using an LRT system. In comparing columns 3 and
4, it is evident that, in every case, the amortized annual capital cost of LRT systems
are invariably higher than the operational cost savings generated by LRT systems.
Since operational savings of LRT systems do not cover their capital costs, a common argument is to expand bus service as a more feasible alternative to investing
in capital intensive light rail projects. A recent paper by Thompson and Matoff
(2003) analyzes bus systems in selected cities and comes to the conclusion that
“regions that choose to improve their public transit systems based on express
buses do not escape making heavy capital expenditures”(p. 311). Thompson and
Matoff also point out that arguments based on “saving” money on capital investment projects and routing those savings to expanding bus services seem fallacious.
They point out that:
The region that made the smallest capital investment in its transit system—
Columbus—severely reduced the amount of service that it provided per capita.
If the position of the critics were correct, Columbus, by not “wasting” funds on
capital investment, should have had large resources left over to greatly expand
its bus service; obviously, that has not happened…. It is clear that transit agencies
that have pursued development of multidestinational networks that include rail
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for trunk lines have been able to generate significant ridership without sacrificing
effectiveness, efficiency or equity. (p. 311).
As pointed out earlier, the wide variations in capital costs of LRT systems arise
primarily from the type of construction as well as factors like right of way acquisition costs. If one considers only projects since 2000 (and ignores an outlier such
as Seattle), the approximate average construction costs per mile of an LRT system
is about $35 million per mile. A base estimate for the Heartland Light Rail project,
then, is $945 million ($35 million per mile x 27 miles). This value is, in fact, the same
as that assumed in the Kansas City light rail ballot initiative. If one makes allowances for cost escalations and inflation, a reasonable capital cost estimate for the
Heartland Light Rail project is about $1 billion. This value is used in the subsequent
sensitivity analysis.
Federal Funding
Even though the dollar value of federal capital funds assistance to transit agencies
has been increasing over the last decade, the percentage contributed by federal
agencies has been generally falling. The percentage of federal funding assumed in
the Central Business Corridor Transit Study is 60 percent. This is an unrealistically
high percentage that is out of line with the realities of current federal capital funding. The most recent data from the National Transit Database suggests that the
current level of federal assistance is about 39 percent. This is used as a base value
for federal assistance in the subsequent analysis.
In light of the above, previous values assumed in the Central Business Corridor plan
are readjusted to reflect the current realities of capital costs and federal funding. In
addition, the operating phase of the project is adjusted to be 25 years rather than
the 17 years assumed in the Central Business Corridor study. The revised capital/
operating phase, cost, and revenue assumptions are reported in Table 10.
The NPV based on these results is not encouraging. The Heartland Light Rail project consistently runs a loss in almost every year, with the result that the project
NPV is about -$343 million. (See the last column of Table 11 for the discounted
project cash flow estimates). Given that capital and operating costs are not subject
to a decrease, the only way that the project would be viable is if fare box revenues
were to increase dramatically. What would fare revenues need to be for the project
to break even? The financial model indicates that fare box revenues would have
to be $52.27 million in the first year of the project with ridership increasing at 2
percent p.a. over the 25-year operating phase of the project. At a single-trip fare
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Table 10. Revised Project Cost/Revenue Assumptions

of $2.50, with a fare revenue of $52.27 million, implies 20.908 million annual passenger boardings, or 41,816 weekday round-trip boardings. This level of ridership
is not unattainable. The most recent data available from the St. Louis Metrolink
system indicate that, over the annual period from July 2006 to June 2007, the
Metrolink system accommodated 16.885 million or 33,772 round-trip weekday
boardings15—an increase of 43 percent over the previous year. Moreover, the
Kansas City transit corridor contains 250,000 jobs and an estimated population of
about 300,000 within ½ to ¾ miles of the transit corridor.16 If these two factors are
anything to go by, a weekday ridership that would eventually result in a project
breakeven for the Kansas City LRT system is not out of the question.
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Note: For definition of Total Capital Outflows, Total Capital Inflows, and Net Cash Flow, see notes for Table 3.

Table 11. Project Cost and Revenue Flows (in millions): Final Estimates—cont’d.
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Social Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Heartland Light Rail Project
An important aspect to recognize about financial analysis is that, even though
financial analysis of projects is invariably useful, the finances involved in a project
essentially represent transfer payments between different economic entities—
e.g., from federal taxpayers to local economies or from one group of tax payers to
another. A more comprehensive analysis should take into account the economic/
social costs and benefits generated by infrastructural projects. The previous section implied that daily round trip ridership of the Heartland Light Rail project
would have to be about 42,000 for the project to break even. Suppose the actual
level of ridership falls far short of this level? Could the project still be justified based
on other social benefit/social cost arguments?
There is a logical reason for the inability of most mass transit systems to be profitable. After a century of massive government investment in roads and highways,
the cost of motor vehicle transportation is subsidized to such an extent that public
transit systems find it impossible to raise fares by enough to be operationally selfsufficient. Vuchic (1999)17 referring to a study by the U.S. Office of Technology
Assessment (OTA) estimates that car drivers pay only about 60 percent of the
total costs of their travel while the other 40 percent (highway construction costs,
maintenance costs, etc.) is subsidized by different levels of government. Other
implicit costs, such as free parking, are subsidized by employers, store owners,
schools, etc., while various social and environmental costs are absorbed by society.
It is, thus, hardly surprising that public transit systems are unable to compete
against motor vehicle transportation. Henry and Dobbs (2005, p.3)18 make a similar argument:
The competing roadway-based transportation systems … have been structured to minimize motorists’ out-of-pocket costs. The high costs of private
motor vehicle travel are covered by a largely unobtrusive umbrella of public
and private subsidization as well as the transfer of “external costs” (like accidents and air pollution) to the general public…. Against this heavily subsidized, government promoted competition, public transport operators find it
impossible to charge fares high enough to secure “profitable” operation.”
An estimate of the costs of auto transportation should, therefore, take into
account the externalities imposed by auto traffic such as congestion, accidents,
pollution, time delays, etc. Several studies provide estimates of the total cost of
motor vehicle use. Among the most comprehensive are those by Delucchi (1996),
Small (1997), Small (1999), Delucchi (1997),19 and Delucchi (2000). While the
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1996 and 1997 studies by Delucchi provide estimates of the total cost of all motor
vehicle usage, Delucchi (2000) breaks down the external costs of motor vehicle
usage into costs for different transportation modes. Table 12 includes Delucchi’s
estimates of the external costs of the two primary competing modes considered
in this section—auto transportation and light rail transportation.20
Table 12. External Costs of Passenger Transportation Modes
(cents per vehicle mile)

The possible range of external costs per passenger mile for autos is 5 to 28 cents, or
a mid-point cost estimate of 11.70 cents. If one subtracts the external cost of .35
cents for light rail from this figure, the result (approximately 11 cents) constitutes
an estimate of the external cost benefit provided by light rail over auto transportation. To this figure of 11 cents per passenger mile we need to add other positive
externalities provided by LRT that were not explicitly valued in the Delucchi study.
These include land use impact, preservation of wetlands, land erosion control,
emission reduction benefits, conservation of non-renewable resources, rising
property values around rail corridors, revitalization of transit corridors, enhanced
mobility for the transit dependent, etc. In the current situation of rising gasoline
prices, these positive externalities are likely to be considerable.
Quantifying the social benefits that arise from light rail is not easy. While operating and capital costs of light rail are explicit and thus easily quantified, many of
the social benefits conferred by light rail are implicit and therefore easily ignored
in policy debates. The problem of overlapping benefits and double counting
involved in quantifying external benefits adds to the uncertainty surrounding
such estimates. However, such social benefits could, in fact, be considerable. The
following examples from the literature provide some notion of the dollar values
attributed to these externalities.21 McPhearson et al. (1997) estimate that increas80
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ing tree cover by 10 percent saves annual heating and cooling costs by $50 to $90
per dwelling. They also estimate the NPV of a single tree to be $402. Riddel (2001)
estimates that as a result of 15,000 acres of open space, housing prices in Boulder,
Colorado increased an average of $10,000 for median-priced homes. Roe, Irwin and
Morrow-Jones (2004) found that a 10 percent increase in the amount of farmland
led to a rise in housing prices of $394 for lower priced homes and about $1,100 for
higher priced homes. Kiker and Hodges (2002) estimated the economic benefits
of natural lands in Northeast Florida at $2.6 billion per year. A subsequent study
by Kroeger (2005) extended the Kiker and Hodges’ work to other types of benefits
and arrived at an even higher value of $3.2 billion per year.22 Table 13 summarizes
the cost estimates provided by various studies on land use impact effects:23
Table 13. Land Use Impact of Auto Travel

The land use impact estimates in Table 13 are subject to a substantial degree of
uncertainty. Some of the effects reported above may be double counted; other
effects are ignored since they simply cannot be easily quantified. The most significant of the non-quantified effects is the effect of light rail transit on property
values. Suppose for the time being we ignore this effect. The fundamental political issue then centers on whether the “subsidy” to rail transit (the negative NPV
of $343 million that was computed in the earlier section) could be offset by the
implicit positive externalities conferred by the LRT system. How large would these
externality benefits need to be? A negative NPV of $343 million over 33 years discounted at 7 percent p.a. implies that the LRT system would have to confer annual
benefits of $26.89 million every year for 33 years for the project to break even. Are
savings of such magnitude feasible?
The external cost estimates above imply that a conservative estimate of the net
external cost savings from light rail over auto transport is about 11 cents per passenger mile. The land use impact savings from LRT adds another 14 cents, for a
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total of 25 cents. Since there is almost certainly some element of double counting
between Delucchi’s estimates and the land use impact effects reported in Table
13, assume that the land use impact effect is not 14 cents but only half as much,
or 7 cents. This results in a net external cost savings of 18 cents per passenger mile.
Given that the average driver’s round-trip work commute is about 30 miles per
day in Kansas City,24 this implies that annual external cost savings would be $26.89
million if the number of cars would decrease by 19,919 per workday ($.18/mile x
30 miles/day x 250 days/year x 19,919 cars).25 In other words, if 19,919 cars were
taken off the roads because of a travel mode shift from auto travel to light rail
transit, the Heartland Light Rail project would be justifiable based on the savings
in external costs alone.
The external cost savings of 18 cents per mile is one possible estimate of external
costs. A larger estimate of external costs is provided in a comprehensive study
conducted by the Victoria Transport Policy Institute (VTPI) on the externalities
imposed by motor vehicle travel. The VTPI study considers 20 different cost categories separated into internal and external costs, including such external costs
as parking, congestion, land value, transport diversity, pollution, noise, barrier
effects, waste, etc.,and estimates such external costs26 at 59 cents per vehicle mile,
more than three times the 18 cents in external cost savings considered earlier. This
implies that the required decrease in the number of cars is even lower at 6,077 cars
per work day to generate the equal annuity amount of $26.89 million ($.59/mile x
30 miles/day x 250 days/year x 6,077 cars).27
It should be noted that the external cost estimates used above do not take into
consideration the effect that light rail would have on property values. The Central Business Corridor Transit Plan estimates that the Heartland light rail project
would stimulate new investment of more than U$ 1 billion, increase employment
by about 13,000 and provide new annual taxes of about U$17 million.28 If these
property impact estimates are even marginally correct, it is then quite probable
that the substantial overhead costs involved in light rail would essentially pay for
itself through its externality effects.

Conclusion
The Heartland Light Rail project represents Kansas City’s biggest infrastructural
investment in decades. The ballot initiative for the light rail project was voted
down three times until it was finally approved in November 2006. The very fact
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that the light rail project idea was so resilient in the face of strenuous opposition
provides some evidence that LRT may be an idea whose time has finally arrived in
Kansas City.
A strict financial analysis of the project is not encouraging. Using best estimates of
construction costs, operating expenses and federal funding, the NPV of the project is estimated to be negative $343 million. However, if one were to include the
annual savings in external costs from lower auto travel, the Kansas City light rail
project becomes an increasingly attractive option.
Since light rail projects involve substantial public funding a debate on their costs
and benefits appropriately belongs in the domain of public policy. A major problem, however, in rationally evaluating the merits of such projects is that the public
dialogue is often complicated by studies that make their case by either considering
only costs that are explicit or ignoring non-monetized, implicit social benefits. The
truth seems to be that if evaluated on a strict financial basis alone, light rail systems
are unlikely to be completely self-sufficient. However, if light rail losses are not of
such a magnitude that the project is completely unfeasible, it is very probable that
social benefits could still render such projects worthwhile.
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Endnotes
1

The Road Information Program (TRIP), “Rough Ride in the City: Metro Areas
with the Roughest Rides and Strategies to Make our Roads Smoother,” October
2006.

2

“Central Business Corridor Transit Plan,” Final Report, April 27, 2001.

3

These data are from the 2003 Highway Statistics published by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA).

4

See the Texas Transportation Institute’s 2004 Urban Mobility Study.
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5

See Chart 3 (page 16) of The Road Information Program (TRIP), “Rough Ride in
the City: Metro Areas with the Roughest Rides and Strategies to Make our Roads
Smoother,” October 2006.

6

Typically, a project’s cost of capital should be computed as a weighted average cost of capital (WACC) where the weights are the proportions of debt and
equity and the costs pertain to the cost of debt and cost of equity. The cost of
equity is typically determined using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).
This method of estimating WACC is inapplicable for publicly funded projects
since no equity is issued. An approximate cost of capital for the Kansas City LRT
project can be determined thus. The cost of capital of a project is linked to the
risk of the underlying assets supporting the project. In 2007, Kansas City issued
General Obligation (GO) bonds at a yield of 4.60%. Assuming that the LRT project is more risky than Kansas City’s asset base, we can add a “premium” over
the yield of Kansas City GO bonds. Adding a premium of 200 basis points or 2%
results in the assumed project cost of capital of 7%. For a detailed discussion of
project valuation see Chapter 19 of Principles of Corporate Finance, “Financing
and Valuation,” Brealey, Myers and Allen (2006).

7

Note that the project is non-normal—that is, negative cash flows occur during
the life of the project. In such situations, the IRR criterion can be misleading. In
the subsequent analysis, the IRR values are not reported for this reason.

8

I continue to assume that operating costs will increase by 4% p.a. from the base
year estimate of operating and maintenance costs.

9

Given that the American Public Transportation Association has estimated that
the total cost of riding public transportation (including transfers, parking, etc.)
at a base fare of $2.50 is $2454/year versus estimated driving costs for midsize
cars of $8,580/year, public transportation seems a bargain. However, whether
the public perceives it this way, especially in auto dependent areas like Kansas
City, remains to be seen.

10

Some of these values are also reported in Toole (2005), “Does Light Rail Pay for
Itself?” (see www.ti.org/vaupdate57.html). I follow a similar logic to that in the
article in determining operational cost savings for light rail. The sample set of
cities reported in the table is limited to those cities for which construction costs
for light rail are available. This is to facilitate a comparison of operational cost
with capital costs. See a subsequent section of this paper.
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11

An important part of the reason is that since light rail systems serve the densest
transit corridors, operational costs for light rail generally tend to be lesser than
low passenger density serving bus systems.

12

See Table 1 of Baum-Snow and Kahn (2005). Data for LRT capital costs in some
major cities is unfortunately not available. For instance, data on capital costs for
both D.C. and Chicago’s rail transit system are unavailable.

13

Construction cost data from the Baum-Snow and Kahn (2005) paper is converted into 2003 dollars and reported in Toole (2005), “Does Light Rail Pay for
Itself?” (see www.ti.org/vaupdate57.html).

14

The average life span of rail hardware is 30 years. The amortization rate of 7% is
prescribed by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) for amortizing capital
costs. See Toole (2005).

15

“Metro System Ridership” numbers reported on www.metrostlouis.org

16

This estimate is contained in the Kansas City Long Range Transportation Plan,
Figure 5-7, pp. 5-13. See also Exhibits 1 and 2 that depict the spatial and demographic characteristics of the primary transit corridor.

17

Vuchic, Transportation for Livable Cities, Center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers University, December 1999.

18

Henry and Dobbs, “Why St. Louis’s MetroLink Light Railway is a Mobility Bargain,” May 2005. Available on www.lightrailnow.org

19

Delucchi (1997) is a comprehensive study of the total social cost of motor
vehicle use based on 20 reports published by the UC Institute of Transportation
Studies, Davis. Delucchi (1996) provides a summary of the 1997 study.

20

The estimates here are extracted from page 12 of Delucchi (2000). In the actual
table provided by Delucchi, there is an estimate of government subsidies for
light rail which increases the total external cost of light rail. I ignore this subsidy
for light rail since my focus here is to ask the question, Are the positive externalities provided by light rail sufficient to offset the cost disadvantages arising from
the high capital cost of the Heartland LRT System?

21

See Banzhaf and Jawahar (2005) for a comprehensive introduction to this literature.
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22

The underlying research in both these papers contributed to a provision passed
by the Florida legislature in 2005. The provision encourages local governments
to require a full cost accounting analysis for any proposed new development.

23

See Litman (2007), Table 5.14-13, p. 5.14-21.

24

U.S. Census Bureau data indicate that the mean travel time to work in Missouri
is about 23 minutes. At 40 mph, this indicates an average one-way commute of
about 15 miles.

25

This calculation assumes one passenger per car. In addition to these external
costs, TRIP estimates that the poor condition of roads in Kansas City imposes an
additional operational cost per automobile of $651 per year.

26

Victoria Transport Policy Institute, Transportation Cost and Benefit Analysis,
May 2007 (available on www.vtpi.org). See Table 6-6 on pp. 6-10.

27

In addition to these external costs, TRIP estimates that the poor condition of
roads in Kansas City impose an additional operational cost per automobile of
$651 per year.

28

See Appendix B of the Central Business Corridor Transit Plan, Final Report.

29

See Castelazo and Garrett (2004)’s “Light Rail: Boon or Boondogle,” which
invokes the “give them a Toyota Prius instead” argument. A response to this
study is contained in Henry and Dobbs (2005), “Why St. Louis’s Metro Link Railway in a Mobility Bargain.”
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Abstract
This paper addresses an unconventional design for accommodating bus U-turns
at signalized intersections based on a case study in Miami, Florida. Field data were
collected at the study site, including traffic volumes, traffic conflicts, pedestrian/
bicyclist activities, signal phase sequence, headway of buses, and radii of bus U-turns.
A detailed operational analysis was performed at the signalized intersection using
Synchro. The results of the operational analysis indicate that implementation of the
unconventional bus U-turn design at the signalized intersection will not cause major
operational problems when the total entering volume is less than 4,000 vehicles per
hour. To address the safety concerns at the study intersection, both crash analysis
and conflict analysis were conducted. A review of accident data for the subject
intersection indicates that accidents related to the bus U-turn occur infrequently.
The eight-hour conflicts analysis showed that very few conflicts were caused by bus
U-turn movements.
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Introduction
Many studies about the operational and safety effects of U-turns at unsignalized
and signalized intersections have been conducted. Past research results show that
there is no evidence to prove that U-turns at medians or signalized intersections
present major safety or operational problems (Potts et al. 2004, Carter et al. 2005,
Zhou et al. 2002). However, few studies have been found to deal with heavy vehicle
U-turns. There is typically inadequate geometry for a bus to make a U-turn from
the exclusive left-turn lane at most signalized intersections. This paper addresses
an unconventional design for accommodating a bus U-turn at a signalized intersection based on a case study in Miami, Florida.

Background
Miami-Dade Transit (MDT) was requested by the City of Sunny Isles Beach to
evaluate the safety of buses on Routes E and S that make a U-turn at the intersection of Collins Avenue (SR A1A) and Galahad Dade Boulevard (193rd Street).
Presently, both of these routes require northbound buses to make U-turns at the
subject intersection, then return southward along Collins Avenue before continuing on to the Aventura Mall.

Purpose
The purpose of this analysis is to provide policy makers with an objective assessment of the traffic operations and safety of the current routing at the subject
intersection. In addition, this study indicates under what traffic conditions the
unconventional design for bus U-turn may cause traffic congestion and safety
problems.

Existing Conditions
A site review was conducted to assess the existing operational and design characteristics of the intersection on December 14 and 15, 2004. The study intersection is located at Collins Avenue (SR A1A) and Galahad Dade Boulevard (193rd
Street). The major roadway direction is north-south bound on SR A1A, which is a
four-lane, divided arterial with a speed limit of 35 mph. The minor roadway direction is east-west bound on 193rd Street. The east side of the intersection is the
entrance to a residential condominium, Ocean One. The west side of 193rd Street
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is a private two-lane street that provides access to OceanView. An unconventional
U-turn lane for bus was installed before the residential condominium was built in
2001. Figure 1 shows the intersection layout at the subject intersection.

Figure. 1 Intersection Layout at the Subject Intersection
At the intersection, the northbound buses that will be making the U-turn are
channelized and separated to the right of the adjacent through-traffic by a striped
separator of approximately six feet. The traffic signals for the bus U-turn and the
northbound left-turns are optically programmed signal heads, which restrict the
visibility of these indications in adjacent lanes. This helps to keep northbound
through-traffic on Collins from being confused by the conflicting indication for
the bus U-turn.

Data Collection
Field data were collected on December 14 and 15, 2004. A video camera was used
to record traffic operations at the intersection from the top of Marco Polo Ramada
Plaza Beach Resort, located approximately 1,000 feet south of the intersection. A
total of eight hours of videotape was recorded, including two AM peak hours, two
PM peak hours, two noon hours, and two non-peak hours.
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Traffic data were obtained from the videotapes. While reviewing the videotapes,
researchers tracked each vehicle movement at the intersection, especially the bus
U-turn movements. The following information was recorded:
• eight-hour turning movement counts
• traffic conflicts
• pedestrian/bicyclist activities
• signal phase sequences
• headways of buses
• radii of bus U-turns
Crash data for the subject intersection were provided by the Florida Department
of Transportation, District 6 Traffic Operations Office. The crash data were pulled
for three years, from 2001 to 2003. The system timing data for the subject intersection were obtained from Miami-Dade County.
Additionally, the data collection phase involved a meeting with representatives
from the City of Sunny Isles Beach to assess their concerns about the bus U-turn
at this intersection. The expressed concerns are summarized as follows:
• U-turning of buses across the intersection is an unusual and unexpected
maneuver; this could cause confusion for unfamiliar motorists (tourists and
visitors).
• U-turning of buses causes congestion at the intersection.
• U-turn maneuvers cause traffic safety concerns.
• U-turning buses create a possible hazard for people standing on the
southwest corner of the intersection due to the tracking of the U-turning
buses.
• Exhaust fumes from the buses pollute the area of Ocean One.
• Buses waiting in the bus lane block the visibility of bicyclists and pedestrians,
especially for northbound traffic turning right (across the bus lane) into the
Ocean One condominium entrance.
The City has suggested that Miami-Dade Transit consider relocating the U-turn
for routes E and S up to Hallandale Beach Boulevard, approximately 3 miles to the
north.
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Operational Analysis
The subject intersection currently operates at an acceptable level of service (LOS)
based on the eight-hour field observation on a typical weekday. The intersection
geometry, traffic volumes, and signal timing data were collected for a detailed
analysis. Synchro 6.0 software was used to perform the capacity and LOS analyses
for four different time periods: AM peak hours (7:00-9:00 AM), noon peak hours
(11:00 AM-1:00 PM), PM peak hours (4:00-6:00 PM), and non-peak hours. Synchro is
a complete software package for modeling and optimizing traffic signal timings and
implements the methods of the 2000 Highway Capacity Manual (HCM), Chapter 16,
“Signalized Intersections”. It provides an easy-to-use solution for single intersection
capacity analysis and timing optimization. Synchro defaults to calculate the percentile delay, which is different from the HCM’s average control delay. Synchro’s output
also provides the average control delay based on the HCM methods.
The HCM’s average control delays from Synchro’s output are summarized in Table
1. As listed in Table 1, the overall intersection currently operates at LOS “A” during
the AM peak hours and noon time, and at LOS “B” during the afternoon and PM
peak hours. Bus U-turn volume is approximately 15 buses per hour for both peak
and non-peak hours. The bus headway is about four minutes for buses making a
U-turn at the intersection. The average control delay of U-turning buses is approximately 53 seconds per vehicle. The LOS of bus U-turns is “D.” The through-traffic
on SR A1A operates at LOS “A” or “B”. The left-turn and right-turn vehicles from
the minor road operate at an acceptable LOS “D.” The analysis results show that
the bus U-turn does not cause major operational problems at the intersection.
This is because the overall intersection is currently operating at level of service “A”
or “B,” and no individual lane group is worse than LOS D.
To determine under what volume conditions adding a bus U-turn will significantly
increase the overall delay at the intersection, additional operational analyses were
conducted by gradually increasing the traffic volumes at the intersection. All
approaches received the same percentage increase, except the bus U-turn volume.
Figure 2 shows the impact of increasing the bus volumes and total volumes entering
the intersections. Four curves were developed for bus volumes: 0, 10, 20, and 30 buses
per hour. According to the Highway Capacity Manual, the LOS of the intersection is
“E” when the average delay is greater than 55 seconds per vehicle. Figure 2 indicates
the intersection operates at LOS “E” when the bus volume and total volume entering
the intersection are (30, 4500), (20, 5000), (10, 5375), and (0, 6375).
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Table 1. Level of Service (LOS) at the Study Intersection

Figure 2. Impact of Bus Volumes on the Intersection Delays
This implies that an increase in bus volume from 0 to 10 buses per hour could
reduce capacity by 16 percent, an increase in bus volume from 10 to 20 buses per
hour could reduce an additional 7 percent, and an increase in bus volume from
20 to 30 buses per hour would reduce capacity by another 10 percent. Figure 2
also suggests that the intersection always operates at LOS “C” or better when the
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total volume entering the intersection is less than 4,000 vehicles per hour and bus
U-turn volume is no more than 30 buses per hour.

Safety Analysis
Both crash analysis and conflict analysis were conducted to evaluate the safety
of the subject intersection. Data collected include three-year crash data and
eight-hour videotape for traffic conflicts. Researchers paid special attention to
the crashes and conflicts caused by U-turning buses. Both crash frequency and
crash rates are used for crash analysis, and the number of conflicts and conflict
rates were computed for conflicts analysis. The percentage of crashes and conflicts
related to bus U-turns were used to indicate the impacts of bus U-turns on the
intersection safety.
Crash Analysis
Crash data at the subject intersection were collected for a three-year period (2001
to 2003). The total number of recorded crashes was approximately 27 in the
three-year period, an average of 9 crashes per year. This number is relatively low
when compared to the high crash intersection with over 15 crashes per year in the
county. Five of the crashes were bus-related. All five were property-damage-only
crashes. There were two bus-related accidents in 2001 and 2002, and one accident
related to bus U-turns in 2003. The accidents involving the bus were caused mainly
by careless driving or the ignoring of the traffic signal by the other drivers.
Figures 3, 4, and 5 illustrate the percentages of each type of crash in the years 2001,
2002, and 2003, respectively. Figure 6 shows the percentage of each type of crash
in the three-year period. Approximately 64 percent of the total crashes were rearend and sideswipe, especially on southbound SR A1A. These two types of crashes
are caused by the unexpected left turns from southbound SR A1A and the blockage problem on the right-turn-only lane by the bus stop approximately 200 feet
away from the intersection on southbound SR A1A.
It is interesting that the total number of crashes has dropped from 13 in 2001 to 5
in 2003. The corresponding crash rates also were significantly reduced, from 1.32
to 0.50 (accidents per million entering vehicles) from 2001 to 2003. The number
of injuries also has dropped from 6 to 1 from 2001 to 2003. This implies that the
intersection safety has improved in the last few years. Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the
trend of crash frequency and crash rates from 2001 to 2003.
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Figure 3. Distribution of Crash Type in 2001

Figure 4. Distribution of Crash Type in 2002

Figure 5. Distribution of Crash Type in 2003
Legend: LT=left turn, RT=right turn, RE=rear end, SS=side swipe
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Figure 6. Distribution of Crash Type, 2001 - 2003

Figure 7. Change of Crash Frequency, 2001 - 2003

Figure 8. Change of Crash Rates, 2001 – 2003
(accidents per million entering vehicles)
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The critical crash rate method was used to determine the safety level of the study
intersection. This statistical tool can be used to screen for high-accident locations
by utilizing a confidence interval that can be adjusted up or down to accommodate the needs of a particular safety program. If a segment has an actual crash
rate higher than the critical rate, the location may have a potential highway safety
deficiency and may need additional analysis. To compute the critical crash rate for
a site, the following equation was used:
Fc=F+k(F/M)1/2 +1/(2M)
Where:
Fc = the critical crash rate
F = statewide average crash rate
K = a probability constant. K = 3.291 for a 99.95% confidence level for
urban area
M = vehicle exposure, calculated per million entering vehicles (MEV)
The Florida statewide average crash rates for intersections that have the characteristics of being 4-5 lanes, 2-way, divided, raised, and 4-leg are 0.479, 0.473, and
0.445 crashes per million vehicles for the years 2001, 2002, and 2003, respectively.
Based on the above equation, the corresponding critical crash rates for the year
2001, 2002, and 2003 are 1.26, 1.32, and 1.19, respectively. The crash rates in the
years 2002 and 2003 are less than their critical crash rates. The crash rate in the
year 2001 is a slightly higher than its critical crash rate. However, the actual average
crash rate for the three-year period is 0.89 at the intersections, which is lower than
the critical crash rate of 1.25 during the same period. This implies that the location
has no potential safety deficiency.

Conflicts Analysis
The purpose of the conflicts analysis is to identify the potential conflicts between
buses and other vehicles or pedestrians/bicyclists. Traffic conflicts are interactions
between two or more drivers where one or both drivers take an evasive maneuver
to avoid a collision (Robertson et al. 1994, Parker and Zegeer 1988, Parker and
Zegeer 1988a). In this study, traffic conflicts at the intersection were used as an
additional measure to quantify the safety effects of bus U-turns at the intersection.
These conflict types are:
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• slow vehicle, same direction conflict (C1)
• lane change conflict (C2)
• bus U-turn conflict (C3)
• angle conflict (C4)
• pedestrian and vehicle conflict (C5)
Based on this definition of traffic conflict, an occurrence was considered as a conflict when a vehicle applied brakes, swerved, or noticeably decelerated to avoid a
collision. Data were extracted by tracking each vehicle movement from videotapes
for an eight-hour period.
As shown in Table 2, a total of 48 conflicts were recorded by videotape. Most of
the conflicts were of type C1 (16 rear-end conflicts), and type C2 (17 lane change
conflicts). This is due to the fact that there is a bus stop on the outside lane of
southbound SR A1A that becomes a right-turn-only lane providing access to the
Lehman Causeway.
Table 2. Summary of Traffic Conflicts Observed in the Field

The signal phase sequence at this intersection has the bus U-turn, followed by
the northbound protected-left-turn (with concurrent through-traffic), followed
by the northbound and southbound through-green, then the east-west movements. Due to the heavy use of the bus stop mentioned above, passenger loading
and unloading time is typically greater than the time allotted for the northbound
protected-left-turn phase. Thus, the southbound through-vehicles are released
prior to the bus leaving the stop. This results in brief periods of congestion where
vehicles have to slow down or make a quick lane change to avoid the stopped bus.
This is how most of the observed rear-end and sideswipe conflicts occurred.
A total of 10 angle conflicts (type C4) were recorded. A few vehicles (average 2-4
vehicles per hour) were observed attempting to make a left turn from southbound
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SR A1A into Ocean One, which caused angle conflicts with northbound throughvehicles because it is a prohibited movement. Some conflicts also were observed
between left-turning vehicles from Ocean One and right-turning vehicles from
OceanView. A total of two conflicts caused by bus U-turns were observed in eight
hours.
Two types of conflict rates were calculated. The first one is the ratio between conflicts and the number of hours of observation. The number of conflicts per hour
shows the conflicts that might be found during different hours of the day. The second one corresponds to the ratio between conflicts and traffic volumes. This rate
is defined as the number of conflicts per thousand involved vehicles by maneuver type. As shown in Table 2, there were, on average, 6 conflicts in an hour and
approximately 2.7 conflicts per thousand vehicles involved at the intersection.
Overall, it was found that the results of the conflict study are very consistent with
the crash analysis. Based on the limited number of conflicts and crashes caused by
bus U-turns, there is no indication that U-turning buses are a major safety concern
at the subject intersection.

Observations and Conclusions
To overcome geometric constraints, an unconventional design was implemented
to accommodate the U-turn of the buses at the intersection. Based on our observations at the intersection, Florida DOT and Dade County Traffic Engineers have
done an outstanding job in accommodating this unusual situation in the best
manner possible. With the use of optically-programmed traffic signals, the confusion to the motorists should be minimal. To unsuspecting motorists, there should
not be any conflicting information displayed—they simply see standard traffic
signal indications. When it is the bus’s turn to go, the motorists see a red signal and
should be expected to understand and abide by it.
The results of operational analysis show that the subject intersection currently
operates at LOS “A” during AM peak hours and LOS “B” in PM peak hours. The
average delay for the overall intersection is approximately 9-12 seconds per
vehicle. Signal timing and the phase sequence are proper for accommodating the
special bus U-turn movements and appear to do so as effectively and efficiently
as can be expected. The more-detailed operational analysis indicates that implementation of the unconventional bus U-turn design at the signalized intersection
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will not cause major operational problems when the total entering volumes is less
than 4,000 vehicles per hour at the studied location.
The eight-hour conflicts analysis showed that very few conflicts were caused by
bus U-turn movements. A review of accident data for the subject intersection
indicates that accidents related to the bus U-turn occur infrequently. There are,
on average, 1.7 crashes related to the bus U-turns per year. The accidents involving the bus were caused primarily by careless driving or the ignoring of the traffic
signal by other drivers. Crash analysis also indicated that intersection safety has
improved significantly over the three-year period. Based on these limited accident
frequencies and number of conflicts, there is no indication that the bus U-turn at
the subject intersection constitutes a major safety concern.
Of significance is the fact that approximately 64 percent of total crashes are rearend and sideswipe collisions. These two types of crashes are caused by unexpected
left turns from southbound SR A1A and the blockage problem of the right-turnonly lane by the bus stop approximately 200 feet south of the intersection.
It was observed that most buses did not stop behind the stop bar on the bus-Uturn-only lane. The bus lane’s stop line is set back from the stop bar for northbound through-traffic on A1A to provide adequate sight distance for vehicles that
are turning right into Ocean One. On some occasions, the buses initially stopped
in the proper location, but continued to creep up over the stop bar and, on one
occasion, completely over the crosswalk.
Some buses were observed making much larger U-turns than the U-turn pavement markings in the intersection. As indicated by the City, the bus is close to the
curb as it completes its U-turn. Figure 9 shows the damaged curb from vehicles
making the U-turn maneuver. However, as U-turning speeds are typically very low,
the potential for serious crashes is also relatively low.
Relocating the U-turn to Hallandale Beach Boulevard, as suggested by the City,
would add approximately 10 minutes to the bus routes. This would require the
addition of another bus to the route to maintain the current bus headways.
Additionally, this represents an unwanted increase in travel time to the existing
bus patrons. It is doubtful that extending these routes would help to serve any
additional transit customers, in that the areas to the north are currently served by
other Miami-Dade Transit and Broward County Transit routes.
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Figure 9. Possible Damage on the Curb from Bus U-Turns
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